Misinterpreting Yourself

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Abstract

We model an agent who stubbornly underestimates how much his behavior is driven by undesirable motives, and, attributing his behavior to other considerations, updates his views about those considerations. We study general properties of the model, and then apply the framework to identify novel implications of partially naive present bias. In many stable situations, the agent appears realistic in that he eventually predicts his behavior well. His unrealistic self-view does, however, manifest itself in several other ways. First, in basic settings he always comes to act in a more present-biased manner than a sophisticated agent. Second, he systematically mispredicts how he will react when circumstances change, such as when incentives for forward-looking behavior increase or he is placed in a new, ex-ante identical environment. Third, even for physically non-addictive products, he follows empirically realistic addiction-like consumption dynamics that he does not anticipate. Fourth, he holds beliefs that — when compared to those of other agents — display puzzling correlations between logically unrelated issues. Our model implies that existing empirical tests of sophistication in intertemporal choice can reach incorrect conclusions. Indeed, we argue that some previous findings are more consistent with our model than with a model of correctly specified learning.

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1 Introduction

Several lines of research raise the possibility that people have stubborn misconceptions about their own motives or inclinations, especially ones that can be seen as flaws. In full or partial naivete regarding present bias, a person underestimates his tendency to underweight the future (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, and the literature following it). According to a common interpretation, implicit racial bias involves a racist person who thinks of himself as non-racist (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017, Carlana et al., 2022, and the literatures cited therein). And a pervasive theme in academic and non-academic discussions is that many aggressive individuals do not self-identify as such (e.g., Eisikovits and Buchbinder, 1997, Anderson and Umberson, 2001, and citations therein).

A common implication of the above misconceptions is that the person might mispredict his own behavior. A present-biased smoker may predict that he will quit soon, and then not do it. An employer with implicit racial bias may think that he is treating all applicants equally, and then end up with a racially unbalanced team. And an aggressive individual may believe that he will be nicer with his new partner than with his previous one, and then be just as he was before.

In this paper, we ask the natural question: what does a person make of such mispredictions? Building on the quickly growing literature on misspecified learning, we propose that he adjusts his beliefs about other aspects of himself or the environment, which in turn feeds back into his behavior. A smoker who tends to smoke more than he intended and predicted, for instance, may develop the exaggerated belief that smoking helps him concentrate or socialize, or that it is not as harmful for him as for others. We build a general machinery for analyzing the implications of such misinferences, and then apply our framework to partially naive present bias. We show that the combination of partial naivete and the resulting self-justificatory views (i) can explain empirical patterns that existing theories have difficulty simultaneously accounting for, (ii) identifies a flaw in how economists usually think about sophistication, and (iii) makes additional novel predictions.

Section 2 presents our general framework. In each period $t$, the agent observes a period-specific shock $s_t = \Theta + \epsilon_t$, where $\Theta$ is an unknown, normally distributed, time-independent fundamental, and the $\epsilon_t$ are mean-zero normally distributed errors. The agent then chooses an action $a_t$ to maximize the expectation of $v(a_t, s_t, \Theta)$. Crucially, his self-knowledge is limited in two ways. First, after period $t$ he remembers $a_t$ but not $s_t$. This captures the idea that individuals may not remember or even have direct access to all the reasons behind their actions. Second, when interpreting his past
behavior, the agent is misspecified regarding his motives, hoping and thinking that he had been
maximizing the expectation of $\tilde{v}(a_t, s_t, \Theta)$. This captures the mistaken self-conceptions motivating
our paper. Beyond these limitations, however, the agent is rational: he has a correct prior about
$\Theta$, and updates his beliefs using Bayes’ rule.

To aid our analysis, we define an intuitive notion of a stable belief about the fundamental that
we call a self-observation equilibrium (SOE). Suppose that the agent believes the fundamental to be
$\tilde{\theta}$ and acts upon this belief for a long time. Based on his belief $\tilde{\theta}$, he can infer the shocks $\tilde{s}_t$ that he
believes have driven his actions. He can then ask: what fundamental best explains the distribution
of $\tilde{s}_t$? If it is $\tilde{\theta}$, then $\tilde{\theta}$ is a coherent belief, so it is an SOE. An easy-to-check SOE arises when
$\tilde{\theta}$ perfectly explains the distribution of $\tilde{s}_t$, and hence it perfectly explains — and predicts — the
distribution of actions it generates. With $\tilde{\theta}$ being the best explanation for what he observes, in
an SOE the agent sees no reason to change his belief away from $\tilde{\theta}$. Going further, we identify
conditions under which the long-run limit of the beliefs the agent forms based on his actions is
an SOE. In a stable environment, therefore, one can understand long-run beliefs and behavior by
studying SOE’s. And in such an environment, the agent often learns to predict his behavior well,
or even perfectly.

For the rest of our paper, we restrict attention to the important class of problems where the
fundamental $\Theta$ and the shock $s_t$ affect the optimal action in the same direction. Such an “equi-
directional” specification is natural when uncertainty pertains to how much one should consume,
so that information affects optimal actions in different periods in the same direction. For instance,
if the agent learns that smoking is harmful, then he should smoke less in all periods. We establish
a general property of equi-directional problems: for any $v$ and $\tilde{v}$ that have different implications for
optimal actions, the agent’s misspecification is self-defeating according to his wished-for preferences
$\tilde{v}$ (i.e., according to $\tilde{v}$, his utility with the SOE action is strictly lower than if he was correctly
specified). This means that no matter what the agent’s motives are and what he considers less
flawed motives, if he thinks that his motives are less flawed, then his behavior actually becomes
more flawed.

In Section 3, we bring our perspective to bear on partially naive present bias. In this application,
the agent’s true objective $v$ discounts the future consequences of today’s action by the factor $\beta$, but

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1 This definition adapts the spirit of Berk-Nash equilibrium (Esponda and Pouzo, 2016) to our different setting.
his perceived objective \( \tilde{v} \) instead applies the discount factor \( \tilde{\beta} > \beta \). Several new insights emerge.

First, we identify a novel type of harm associated with partial naivete. Namely, as a manifestation of our general result, in equi-directional problems partial naivete is always welfare-decreasing. To illustrate, suppose that the agent chooses the level of harmful consumption \( a_t \) in each period \( t \), and the fundamental \( \Theta \) and signal \( s_t \) pertain to his instantaneous marginal utility of consumption. A basic implication of naive present bias is that he starts off consuming more than he wants or expects. To explain his high consumption, he eventually overestimates his marginal utility. A college student who goes to too many parties due to his present bias, for instance, comes to exaggerate how fun the average party is. This false belief increases his consumption, moving it even further from that of the more patient person he thinks he is. Alternatively, suppose that \( \Theta \) and \( s_t \) pertain to the future harm from consumption. Then, to explain his high consumption, the agent comes to believe that the product is not very harmful. A smoker may, for instance, believe that alternative activities are just as harmful as smoking, or that smoking helps him concentrate, which offsets its negative health consequences. This again exacerbates overconsumption and is therefore welfare-decreasing. And for beneficial goods such as exercise — where naive present bias leads to lower consumption than what the agent prefers and expects — the agent explains his low consumption by underestimating the benefits or overestimating the costs of consumption. Yet again, this is self-defeating because it exacerbates his underconsumption. In contrast to this unambiguously harmful mechanism, in existing models naivete acts only through the (often weak) intertemporal interdependence of consumption decisions, and its effect on the agent’s welfare can be positive or negative. Hence, the main harm from naivete may stem from its impact on other beliefs through misspecified learning.

Second, although in a stable environment the agent may learn to predict his behavior well, he also displays patterns that distinguish him from a realistic agent. In terms of predictions, he is generally incorrect about how he will react to a change in the environment. As a case in point, because he continues to overestimate the weight he will put on the future, he overestimates his response to future incentives. For instance, a smoker may understand that he will continue to smoke at the same rate during the on-going high-pressure period at his job, but also incorrectly believe that he will quit once the stressful period is over. And because the agent does not draw conclusions about his present bias, he mispredicts what he will do when a new fundamental applies, e.g., when
he starts a new diet after previous ones have failed. In terms of beliefs, the agent’s naivete can lead to multiple types of incorrect beliefs, such as the simultaneous beliefs that smoking is beneficial for socialization and that alternative activities are risky. Hence, across a population of agents with different levels of naivete, beliefs about such logically and factually unrelated issues will be correlated.

As a third insight, our theory has implications for the substantial empirical literature on whether individuals are sophisticated in intertemporal choice. This literature — and everyday thinking in the profession — overwhelmingly presumes that a person can be considered sophisticated if he correctly predicts his behavior in the situation at hand (see Ericson and Laibson, 2019, for a review). Such a prediction test, however, is vulnerable to the “apparent sophistication” of a naive agent who acts suboptimally yet predicts his behavior perfectly in an SOE. In this sense, a prediction test is predicated on an extreme view of naivete in which the agent makes no inferences about himself at all, be they correct or incorrect. More generally, on a simple prediction test a partially naive agent may look perfectly sophisticated, exactly as naive as he is, and also more naive than he is.

While the possibility of apparent sophistication has never been explicitly tested, some patterns suggest that it is empirically relevant. Notably, we argue that our model better explains the behavior of experienced payday-loan borrowers in Allcott et al. (2022) than true sophistication does, and conclusions drawn from estimates of these borrowers’ present bias are overly optimistic. Correctly specified learning about present bias implies that as a person learns, his beliefs adjust downwards to his true present bias; whereas our model predicts that measures of his present bias adjust upwards to his belief. The latter is closer to what Allcott et al. find than the former. Furthermore, exactly as our model predicts, Allcott et al. document that borrowers mispredict their responses to a change in incentives. Finally, our model’s prediction that the agent learns to forecast his behavior in a stable environment but does not transfer his knowledge to other environments naturally accounts for a conspicuous general pattern in the literature. Namely, while individuals appear to quickly become sophisticated in some specific settings, in almost all experiments and other studies on less familiar choices, they are quite naive.

Fourth, although our model presumes a physically non-addictive product, it generates dynamic behavior with some features reminiscent of those in existing addiction models. Because the agent accounts for higher past consumption using the belief that his marginal utility is high, as
in intertemporal-complementarities models (e.g., Becker and Murphy, 1988, Gruber and Kősze, 2001) his current consumption is increasing in shocks to past consumption. For the same reason, his consumption profile is often increasing over time. Unlike in the intertemporal-complementarities approach, however, the agent’s consumption does not respond to future prices. In addition, because he comes to overestimate his marginal utility, his consumption eventually becomes too high even from the perspective of his current self. Similarly to mistakes models (e.g., Bernheim and Rangel, 2004) and clinical descriptions of addiction, therefore, consumption is on average not worth it. Finally, our model predicts an intertemporal pattern in the response to news that is unlike in either previous approach. If a smoker receives new negative information regarding the health effects of smoking, he cuts back, but by less than he expects. To account for his lackluster response, he comes to believe in higher benefits from smoking, diminishing or reversing the effect of the news. We argue that some empirical findings provide tentative support for our combination of predictions.

We conclude in Section 4 with some further topics and questions for which our framework promises to be useful, but whose full development we leave for future work. While we have focused on present bias, we can apply our general model to other preferences or tendencies that one might find undesirable. As potentially important examples, we briefly mention cognitive dissonance and implicit bias. We also provide conjectures on the agent’s behavior and welfare in non-equidirectional problems. In some economically natural situations, such as long-horizon consumption-savings or effort-allocation decisions, naivete may benefit a present-biased agent in the extreme sense that he comes to act in a time-consistent way. Whether that happens, however, appears extremely sensitive to the details of the decisionmaking and learning problem.

**Related Literature** As we have indicated, our paper builds on and belongs to a growing literature on learning with “misspecified” models. The core assumption of this literature is that individuals update their beliefs using an incorrect understanding of the situation. Researchers have studied misspecifications about the laws of Bayesian inference (e.g., Rabin, 2002, Rabin and Vayanos, 2010, Benjamin et al., 2016), the causal structure of outcomes (Spiegler, 2016, 2020, Levy et al., 2022), the distribution of others’ types (Ettinger and Jehiel, 2010, Levy and Razin, 2017, Bohren and Hauser, 2019, Frick et al., 2020, 2022), statistical correlations (He, 2021), individual ability (Heidhues et al., 2018, Bohren et al., 2019a, Ba and Gindin, 2021, Murooka and Yamamoto, 2021), market or technological parameters (Nyarko, 1991, Esponda and Pouzo, 2016, Fudenberg
et al., 2017, Heidhues et al., 2021), and memory (Fudenberg et al., 2022). It has been known at least since the prophet Matthew, however, that people are often most miscalibrated about their own flawed inclinations, and our paper analyzes consequences of this important type of misspecification. Formally, our theory — in which the agent interprets actions that he does not know the precise reasons for — is most similar to those on social learning with misspecification (Bohren, 2016, Bohren and Hauser, 2019, forthcoming, Frick et al., 2020, 2021b), but the particular model and questions are very different. And at the technical level, our paper contributes to the literature studying the convergence of belief processes with incorrect inferences and endogenous actions (Esponda et al., 2021, Fudenberg et al., 2021b, in addition to papers cited above), which in general remains an unsolved problem.

Our paper also builds on empirical and experimental research on the general hypothesis that people may use misspecified models in making inferences. For instance, Benjamin (2019) reviews a large literature on inferential mistakes, Bohren et al. (2019a) and Bohren et al. (2019b) document patterns suggesting inaccurate inferences about groups in discrimination settings, and Goette and Kozakiewicz (2018) find that subjects update according to a misspecified model when their own ability is involved. More directly related to our model, two papers document misspecified learning about one’s own preferences, albeit not from actions. Haggag et al. (2018) find that a subject who was experimentally made more thirsty at the time of trying a new drink has higher demand for the drink on future occasions. They also document that consumers who visited an amusement park during a nice weather shock are more likely to return later and to recommend the park to others. In both cases, individuals misattribute their temporary tastes to a permanent preference. In related work, Bushong and Gagnon-Bartsch (2020) find that a subject for whom a task was surprisingly difficult is less likely to want to do it again than a subject who expected the task to be difficult. Here, subjects misattribute the unpleasant surprise to a permanent dislike of the task.

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2 In studying implications of imperfect memory, our paper is also related to other recent economics research (e.g., Mullainathan, 2002, Bodoh-Creed, 2019, Bordalo et al., 2020, 2021, Wachter and Kahana, 2021, K˝ oszegi et al., 2022). All of this previous research posits that recalled memories are sensitive to the current context or decision, whereas our agent’s recollections are not.

3 Matthew 7:3 reads: “Why do you see the speck that is in your brother’s eye, but don’t consider the beam that is in your own eye?” This is an attack on hypocrites who notice a small flaw in others but are blind to a large flaw in themselves. More recently, Fedyk (2021) documents that the average subject understands the present bias of other subjects almost perfectly, but is completely naive about his own present bias.
2 Framework and General Results

2.1 Model

Basics There are infinitely many periods, $t = 1, 2, \ldots$. At the beginning of each period $t$, the agent observes a temporary shock or signal $s_t = \Theta + \epsilon_t$, where $\Theta \in \mathbb{R}$ is an unknown time-invariant fundamental and the $\epsilon_t$ are i.i.d. random variables with mean 0. Afterward, the agent chooses an action $a_t \in A \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ aiming to maximize the expectation of $v(a_t, s_t, \Theta)$. Hence, the utility function $v$ captures his true motives. Both $\Theta$ and the $\epsilon_t$ are normally distributed, and the agent’s prior about $\Theta$ is correct (i.e., it equals the distribution from which $\Theta$ is drawn). Assuming normally distributed shocks simplifies the analysis of convergence, and while inconsequential for long-run behavior, imposing a correct prior simplifies our presentation of results on learning dynamics.

Self-Knowledge The agent’s self-knowledge is limited in two ways. First, he has limited memory: after period $t$, he remembers the action $a_t$ he took but not the shock $s_t$ he observed. He also does not remember, or does not observe, the realized utility $v(a_t, s_t, \Theta)$. Second, he has an incorrect self-view: when interpreting his past behavior or predicting his future behavior, he believes that his objective had been or will be to maximize the expectation of $\tilde{v}(a_t, s_t, \Theta)$. He does not update his belief $\tilde{v}$ about his preferences.

We think of $\tilde{v}$ as capturing motives that the agent not only believes to have, but also wishes to have instead of his true motives $v$. In the case of intertemporal choice, for instance, a partially naive present-biased agent not only expects, but also prefers to be less present-biased than he actually is. Much research observes that individuals often maintain such positive biases in ego-relevant domains. Furthermore, the individuals in question are typically adults who have had plenty of opportunities to learn about themselves. Hence, the biases must be stubborn in that they are not eliminated, or only very slowly eliminated, by learning. Our assumption of deterministic incorrect beliefs provides a tractable way to study the implications of these stubborn biases.\(^4\)

Beyond his biased self-view, the agent understands the decision problem correctly, and in each period computes his belief about $\Theta$ according to Bayes’ rule. We denote his belief at the beginning of period $t$, when he has not yet observed the shock $s_t$, by $\mu_t$. By definition, $\mu_1$ is his prior, and $\mu_t$ is

\(^4\) Nevertheless, the assumption of deterministic beliefs is not literally accurate because individuals do update these beliefs. In fact, one mechanism through which optimistic beliefs might arise and persist is asymmetric updating (e.g., Sharot and Garrett, 2016, Zimmermann, 2020, Drobner, 2022).
obtained from $\mu_1$ by conditioning on past actions $(a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1})$ while assuming that those actions were chosen to maximize the expectation of $\tilde{v}$. At the beginning of period $t$, the agent updates $\mu_t$ by conditioning also on the signal $s_t$, and he then chooses $a_t$ to maximize the expectation of $v(a_t, s_t, \Theta)$ given the resulting belief. The assumption that he does not care about future actions implies that decisions in different periods are linked only through beliefs about the fundamental — and not through strategic interdependence — allowing us to focus on the novel, learning implications of our theory.\textsuperscript{5}

The central feature above, that the agent uses his past actions $a_t$ as evidence of the reasons $s_t$ behind his actions, is extremely natural from many perspectives in psychology as well as economics. In psychology, the hypothesis that a person consciously or subconsciously “concocts the beliefs and desires” consistent with a past action forms the basis for the large literature on rationalization (Cushman, 2020). In behavioral economics, the idea that people do not fully understand their preferences underlies the possibility of various forms of naivete, including naive present bias and projection bias; and the idea that they can learn from their own behavior underlies arguments that they may become sophisticated over time. Similarly, the notion that a person uses past behavior as a guide to understand himself is a basic assumption in various papers on self-signaling (e.g., Bodner and Prelec, 1996, Prelec and Bodner, 2003, Grossman and van der Weele, 2017) and memory (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2002).\textsuperscript{6}

We assume that $v$ and $\tilde{v}$ are twice differentiable and single-peaked in $a_t$. The latter implies that for any $\theta$ and $s$, there are unique optimal actions

$$\pi_\theta(s) = \arg \max_{a \in A} v(a, s, \theta) \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{\pi}_\theta(s) = \arg \max_{a \in A} \tilde{v}(a, s, \theta).$$

We impose that the functions $\pi_\theta$ and $\tilde{\pi}_\theta$ are either strictly increasing in $s$ for all $\theta$ or strictly

\textsuperscript{5} The same assumption also implies that the agent does not use his action to influence the beliefs of future selves, as in the literature on self-signaling. While self-signaling is important in situations with uncertainty and limited memory, it is orthogonal to the issues we study. Indeed, our main focus is on degenerate limiting beliefs about $\theta$, where self-signaling would be irrelevant even if the agent did care about future choices.

\textsuperscript{6} Of course, it is also possible that a person forgets what he did in the past, not only why he did it. Consistent with at least partial forgetting, Carrera et al. (2022) find that providing information about past gym attendance, and making this information salient, changes individuals’ expectations about future behavior. Our model applies only to the extent that individuals accurately recall their past behavior, or are reminded of it somehow. To the extent that forgetting is selective, this introduces a bias that is quite different from the one studied in our paper (Fudenberg et al., 2022).
decreasing in $s$ for all $\theta$, and hence invertible.\footnote{A simple sufficient condition is that the functions $v$ and $\tilde{v}$ are strictly supermodular (or submodular) in $(a, s)$ for every $\theta$ and the maximizer is always interior.} Invertibility implies that our results do not derive solely from a lack of information: remembering the past actions $a_t$ is sufficient for inferring the shocks $s_t$ and therefore learning the fundamental $\Theta$ in the long run.\footnote{Another direct implication of invertibility is that if storing the $s_t$ in memory has any (arbitrarily small) effort cost, then the agent perceives it as optimal not to store the $s_t$. This is because he believes that he can retrieve the $s_t$ based on his memory of his actions $a_t$.} This rules out slow learning as defined by Frick et al. (2021b), where the actions of an agent who is confident in the fundamental reveal no information.

**Self-Observation Equilibrium** We now define our notion of a stable belief about the fundamental $\Theta$. For our definition, we denote the probability density function of the shocks $\epsilon_t$ by $f$.

**Definition 1.** A fundamental $\tilde{\theta}$ is a self-observation equilibrium (SOE) given the true $\Theta$ if

$$\tilde{\theta} = \arg\max_z \int \log f \left( \tilde{\pi}_{\tilde{\theta}}^{-1}(\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(\Theta + \epsilon)) - z \right) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon. \quad (1)$$

Roughly, an SOE is a fundamental such that if the agent both chooses his actions and later interprets the reasons behind his actions based on a point belief on this fundamental, then he has no inducement to change his belief. To understand the definition more precisely, consider what happens as a function of the realized error $\epsilon$ if the agent believes that the fundamental is $\tilde{\theta}$. Given the true fundamental $\Theta$, he observes the shock $s_t = \Theta + \epsilon$, and hence takes the action $a_t = \pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(\Theta + \epsilon)$. But he believes that he is using the policy function $\tilde{\pi}_{\tilde{\theta}}$, so when he remembers his action, he infers that the shock must have been $\tilde{s}_t = \tilde{\pi}_{\tilde{\theta}}^{-1}(a_t) = \tilde{\pi}_{\tilde{\theta}}^{-1}(\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(\Theta + \epsilon))$. Over time, he accumulates a distribution of such $\tilde{s}_t$. Now we can think of the agent as performing a simple sanity check by asking himself: is $\tilde{\theta}$ really the best explanation for the signals $\tilde{s}_t$ I have observed? Capturing such a requirement, Equation (1) says that $\tilde{\theta}$ maximizes, over all possible fundamentals $z$, the expected (log) likelihood of the signals $\tilde{s}_t$ that the agent infers from his past actions. If the equation is satisfied, $\tilde{\theta}$ passes the sanity check, and the agent has no inducement to change his belief.

In most of our applications, we have chosen functional forms so that an SOE’s required consistency between beliefs and behavior takes an extreme form:
Observation 1. The belief $\tilde{\theta}$ is an SOE if for all $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}$ we have

$$\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(\Theta + \epsilon) = \tilde{\pi}_{\tilde{\theta}}(\tilde{\theta} + \epsilon).$$

(2)

Since in this case $\tilde{\pi}^{-1}_{\tilde{\theta}}(\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(\Theta + \epsilon)) = \tilde{\theta} + \epsilon$, $\tilde{\theta}$ is a perfect explanation for the distribution of $\tilde{s}_t$, so — passing the above sanity check with flying colors — $\tilde{\theta}$ is an SOE.\footnote{This result is an implication of Gibbs’ inequality, which shows that the log-likelihood is always maximized at the true data generating process. In our model, this can be established by verifying the first-order condition $\frac{d}{d\bar{z}} \int \log f \left( \tilde{\pi}^{-1}_{\tilde{\theta}}(\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(\Theta + \epsilon)) - z \right) f(\epsilon)d\epsilon|_{z=\bar{z}} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \bar{z}} \int \log f \left( \tilde{\theta} + \epsilon - z \right) f(\epsilon)d\epsilon|_{z=\bar{z}} = -\int \frac{f'(\epsilon)}{f(\epsilon)} f(\epsilon)d\epsilon|_{z=\bar{z}} = 0$ and observing that the expected log-likelihood is strictly concave.} Intuitively, Condition (2) says that the action the agent thinks he chooses coincides with the action he actually chooses for any realized $\epsilon$. This implies that the distribution of actions the agent expects coincides with his actual distribution of actions, so despite his incorrect self-view, he perfectly accounts for his behavior.\footnote{Although the settings are different, the perfect-explanation SOE in Observation 1 is similar in spirit to a self-confirming equilibrium defined, for instance, in Fudenberg and Levine (1993), Ba (2022), and Battigalli et al. (2022). In both cases, the agent’s equilibrium observations must be perfectly consistent with his beliefs, and he must act optimally given his beliefs.} Although Condition (2) is demanding, it is especially easy to confirm in specific settings, so it is useful for understanding the logic of our model.

In the next subsection, we introduce notation for studying the agent’s dynamic learning and optimization problem, and lay out further, technical assumptions to make it tractable. We also identify conditions — satisfied in all our main applications — under which the agent’s beliefs converge to an SOE. This implies that to understand long-run behavior, it is sufficient to analyze SOE’s. Since convergence is typically difficult to establish in models of misspecified learning, we view these formal arguments as an important contribution of our paper.\footnote{Existing convergence results to Berk Nash Equilibrium (e.g., Esponda and Pouzo, 2016, Fudenberg et al., 2017, Bohren and Hauser, 2019, Frick et al., 2021a) do not apply to our setting as there is no direct way of rephrasing the question of convergence under misspecified and incomplete memory to an SOE into the question of convergence under misspecification about the signal structure and perfect memory. We discuss the relationship between our convergence proof and the literature following Proposition 1.} But they are unnecessary for understanding the gist of our applications, so they can be skipped by readers not interested in the technical contribution.

Unawareness Variant  Because it generates essentially the same model, we briefly discuss an alternative to our assumption that the agent forgets $s_t$: that he is unaware of $s_t$ in the first place. To be specific, suppose that the agent learns (and remembers) the function $v(a_t, s_t, \theta)$ for each
realized \( s_t \), but he neither learns the \( s_t \) themselves, nor understands the full function \( v \). In the case of harmful consumption, for example, he may feel an inclination to consume, but not have direct access to the precise reasons for his urge; and in the case of racial bias, he may feel that he should hire the majority applicant, but not have direct access to the precise reasons behind his intuition. As before, the agent believes that his utility function is \( \tilde{v} \). These possibilities are consistent with a long line of research in psychology arguing that people do not understand their mental processes, and interpret them using a-priori fixed theories (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). To make behavior simple to define, we impose that (as in most of our applications) for any \( s_t \) there is a \( \tilde{s}_t \) such that \( v(a_t, s_t, \theta) = \tilde{v}(a_t, \tilde{s}_t, \theta) \) for all \( a_t \) and \( \theta \). A notable auxiliary implication of this condition is that there is never — not even at the moment of choice — an explicit contradiction between \( v \) and \( \tilde{v} \), so it is especially plausible that the agent does not question his belief \( \tilde{v} \). For the same reason, the implications remain unchanged even if the agent remembers his realized utility.

Under the above variant, the definition of and motivation for SOE, and hence the analysis of steady-state behavior, remain unchanged. At the same time, for non-degenerate beliefs the appropriate specification of behavior is slightly different from that in our main model. Since the agent does not observe \( s_t \) in period \( t \), he must infer it from his feeling. Hence, before maximizing the expectation of \( v \), he updates his belief using the \( \tilde{s}_t \) defined above, not using \( s_t \).

### 2.2 Updating Problem, Existence, and Convergence

This subsection establishes convergence of the sequence \( (\mu_t)_t \) of the agent’s beliefs. We start with some definitions and assumptions. First, we extend the optimal and perceived-optimal action functions \( \pi_\theta(s) \) and \( \tilde{\pi}_\theta(s) \) to general beliefs \( \mu \) with which the agent may enter the period:

\[
\pi_\mu(s) = \arg \max_{a \in A} \int v(a, s, z)f(s - z)d\mu(z) \quad (3)
\]

\[
\tilde{\pi}_\mu(s) = \arg \max_{a \in A} \int \tilde{v}(a, s, z)f(s - z)d\mu(z) \quad (4)
\]

We also extend our monotonicity assumption guaranteeing that the policy functions are invertible in \( s_t \):

\[\text{In this case, the agent updates } \mu \text{ using } s \text{ before choosing his action. Formally, the posterior belief distribution after observing } s \text{ is given by } \int f(s - z)d\mu(z'), \text{ but as the maximizer remains unchanged when multiplying the objective by the constant } \int f(s - z')d\mu(z'), \text{ we can state } \pi_\mu, \tilde{\pi}_\mu \text{ in this simpler form.}\]
Assumption 1. For every sequence of actions \((a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1})\) and the corresponding induced posterior \(\mu_t \equiv \mu_t(\cdot; a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1})\), the policies \(\pi_{\mu_t}, {\tilde{\pi}}_{\mu_t}\) are both either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in \(s_t\).

While Assumption 1 amounts to a joint assumption on beliefs and utility functions, we verify below that it is satisfied in all of our applications.

Belief Updating Given the agent’s perceived strategy \(\tilde{\pi}\), he believes to have observed the signal

\[
\tilde{s}_t = \tilde{\pi}_{\mu_t}^{-1}(a_t).
\]

Hence, if he took the action \(a_t\), by Bayes’ Rule for any \(C \subseteq \mathbb{R}\) he updates his beliefs according to

\[
\mu_{t+1}(C) = \frac{\int_{z \in C} f(\tilde{\pi}_{\mu_t}^{-1}(a_t) - z) d\mu(z)}{\int_{z \in \mathbb{R}} f(\tilde{\pi}_{\mu_t}^{-1}(a_t) - z) d\mu(z)}.
\] (5)

Using that the agent’s true strategy is given by \(a_t = \pi_{\mu_t}(s_t)\), we can thus express the dynamics of the agent’s belief process only in terms of the sequence of signals \(s_1, \ldots, s_t\):

\[
\mu_{t+1}(C) = \frac{\int_{z \in C} f(\tilde{\pi}_{\mu_t}^{-1}(\pi_{\mu_t}(s_t)) - z) d\mu(z)}{\int_{z \in \mathbb{R}} f(\tilde{\pi}_{\mu_t}^{-1}(\pi_{\mu_t}(s_t)) - z) d\mu(z)}.
\] (6)

As conditional on the true fundamental signals are independent, (6) establishes that the agent’s beliefs follow a Markov process.

We next introduce an assumption to ensure that the agent’s misspecification is not “too large” and well-behaved:

Assumption 2. There exists a constant \(k > 0\) such that for every time \(t\), every sequence of past actions \((a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1})\), and the corresponding induced posterior \(\mu_t \equiv \mu_t(\cdot; a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1})\), the function \(s \mapsto \tilde{\pi}_{\mu_t}^{-1}(\pi_{\mu_t}(s))\) is continuous; and for every action \(a\)

\[
|\pi_{\mu_t}^{-1}(a) - {\tilde{\pi}}_{\mu_t}^{-1}(a)| \leq k.
\]

Assumption 2 requires that the difference between the signal the agent believes to have observed and the true signal is bounded. Absent this assumption, the agent’s beliefs might diverge, as his
changing actions might lead his misinterpretation of the signals, and thus misinference about $\Theta$, to keep increasing.

We now turn to analyzing the agent’s long-run beliefs and actions. As a useful benchmark, we first observe that in our setting a correctly specified agent (for whom $v \equiv \tilde{v}$) learns the true fundamental $\Theta$ despite his incomplete memory. By Assumption 1, such an agent correctly infers his past signals from his past actions, and because signals are i.i.d. conditional on $\Theta$, by the law of large numbers his beliefs converge to $\Theta$. Thus, his action converges to the optimal action given $\Theta$: 

**Observation 2.** If the agent is correctly specified, i.e. $\tilde{v} = v$, and Assumption 1 is satisfied, then the agent’s belief $(\mu_t)_t \text{ a.s.}$ concentrate on the true fundamental $\Theta$ and the agent’s actions $(a_t)_t \text{ a.s.}$ converge to the action $\pi_{\Theta}(s)$ that is optimal given $\Theta$.

Even more simply, if the agent knew the $s_t$ and updated based on them, then despite his incorrect self-view he would learn $\Theta$. It is therefore the combination of an incorrect self-view and limited memory or self-awareness that leads to the mislearning results of our paper.

Consider now a misspecified agent (i.e., $\tilde{v} = v$). We define the subjective log-likelihood maximizer (which equals the posterior mean) given past beliefs $(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_{t-1})$ and actions $(a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1})$ as:

$$
\tilde{\theta}_t = \text{arg max}_{z \in \mathbb{R}} \left[ \sum_{r=1}^{t-1} \log f_\pi^{-1}(a_r) - z) + \mu_1(z) \right].
$$

(7)

Intuitively, since the fundamental $\tilde{\theta}_t$ maximizes the log-likelihood given past actions, it best explains the agent’s past actions. Now because the agent starts with a normal prior and believes to see independent draws from a normal distribution, the updating formula for conjugate priors implies that his beliefs concentrate around this log-likelihood maximizer in the long-run: there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that for every $t$ and sequence of signals $s$, we have

$$
\int_{\mathbb{R}} (z - \tilde{\theta}_t)^2 d\mu_t(z) \leq \frac{c}{t}.
$$

Given that the agent becomes subjectively certain that the fundamental is the log-likelihood maximizer, it is intuitive that — for a reasonably behaved payoff functions $v$ and $\tilde{v}$ — his action can be approximated by the action that is optimal when having a point belief at $\tilde{\theta}_t$. Indeed, this

---

13 Since the density of the normal distribution is log-concave, the argmax is unique and $\tilde{\theta}_t$ is well defined.
is the case in all our applications below, and to prove convergence we henceforth assume that such an approximation is possible.

**Assumption 3.** There exist constants $c_1, c_2 > 0$ such that for every sequence of past actions $(a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1})$ and the corresponding induced posteriors $\mu_t \equiv \mu_t(\cdot; a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1})$ and every signal $s$, we have

$$
\left| \tilde{\pi}^{-1}_{\mu_t}(s) - \tilde{\pi}^{-1}_{\theta_t}(s) \right| \leq c_1 t^{-c_2}.
$$

Despite the actions converging to those that are optimal given point beliefs on the log-likelihood-maximizing fundamental, it remains unclear whether the log-likelihood-maximizing beliefs converge. The agent’s misspecification of his own payoff function implies that how he interprets past actions depends on his own past beliefs going into the period. Hence, the signals he infers from his actions are not iid conditional on the true fundamental, so that off-the-shelf convergence results do not apply.\footnote{Examples of misspecified learning settings where there is no belief convergence include Nyarko (1991) and Fudenberg et al. (2017).} We overcome this difficulty by analyzing the dynamics of an auxiliary process where we only keep track of the subjective log-likelihood-maximizing state and assume that the agent’s actions are optimal given point beliefs on that state. This belief process is real-valued and tractable. Furthermore, we show that in the long run this process approximates the agent’s beliefs well, which leads to the following result.

**Proposition 1.** An SOE exists. If there are finitely many SOEs, the agent’s beliefs $(\mu_t)_{t}$ almost surely converge to an SOE.

Proposition 1 allows us to determine the agent’s long-run beliefs and behavior not by analyzing the dynamics of the belief process — which lives in the space of distributions over the reals — but by solving (7) — a static fixed-point equation over the reals.

**Relation to Other Belief Convergence Results** Due to the different nature of the decision-making problem, we cannot directly apply existing results on convergence to Berk-Nash Equilibrium (Esponda and Pouzo, 2016, Fudenberg et al., 2017, Heidhues et al., 2018, Bohren and Hauser, 2019, Heidhues et al., 2021, Frick et al., 2021a, Fudenberg et al., 2021a, Esponda et al., 2021) in our setting. In this literature (with exceptions discussed below), the dynamics of the agent’s beliefs — defined as the distribution over changes in his subjective log-likelihood ratios — depend only on his action;
in our model, in contrast, the dynamics also depend on the belief he held at the time of taking the action.\(^\text{15}\) In addition, although our formal model is a social-learning model with misspecification about others’ preferences, most papers studying such models (Bohren, 2016, Bohren and Hauser, 2019, Frick et al., 2020) do not consider continuous states and actions. As the lone exception, Frick et al.’s (2021a) appendix develops a framework with general states that subsumes our model, but we see no obvious way of verifying their convergence-ensuring iterated-dominance condition in our setting. At the same time, although Heidhues et al. (2021) and Esponda et al. (2021) analyze formally and economically very different problems, they use related stochastic-approximation arguments to prove convergence to Berk-Nash equilibrium.

### 2.3 Equi-Directional Problems

Fully analyzing the implications of the general model above is beyond the scope of this paper. As a first step, therefore, we restrict attention to an economically important class of basic environments:

**Definition 2.** A problem is **equi-directional** if \(v\) and \(\tilde{v}\) are either both supermodular or both submodular in \((a, \theta)\) and \((a, s)\).\(^\text{16}\)

In equi-directional problems, increases in the signal \(s_t\) and the fundamental \(\Theta\) change the optimal action \(a_t\) in the same direction. Equivalently, an increase in \(s_t\) changes the optimal action in the current period and — through its effect on beliefs about \(\Theta\) — in future periods in the same direction. This assumption is natural in settings where uncertainty pertains to the benefit or harm of decisions that are not (strong) substitutes, i.e., the main question is how much to consume. For instance, if the agent learns that exercise is beneficial, then he should exercise more, and do so in all periods. On the other hand, equi-directionality rules out situations where uncertainty pertains to both sides of a tradeoff, e.g., the main question is when to consume. We discuss conjectures regarding non-equidirectional problems in the conclusion, but leave a full analysis to future work.

Foreshadowing the rest of the paper, we conclude this section by identifying a general property of equi-directional problems. We define:

\(^{15}\) One may be tempted to resolve the problem by thinking of the policy functions as the actions, because knowing these and the true state makes observed distributions over actions iid. Given the true fundamental, however, how much the agent misperceives his policy function depends on his beliefs.

\(^{16}\) Formally, \(\text{sgn} v_{a,s} = \text{sgn} v_{a,\theta} = \text{sgn} \tilde{v}_{a,s} = \text{sgn} \tilde{v}_{a,\theta}\) for all \(a, \theta, s\), and these cross-derivatives do not change sign.
**Definition 3.** The agent’s self-view is self-defeating if for any $\Theta$ and any corresponding SOE $\tilde{\theta}$, and any signal $s$,

$$
\tilde{v}(\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(s), s, \Theta) < \tilde{v}(\pi_{\Theta}(s), s, \Theta).
$$

Inequality (8) compares the welfare of two agents according to the wished-for preferences $\tilde{v}$. One agent knows that he acts according to $v$, so by Observation 2 he learns $\Theta$ and takes the action $\pi_{\Theta}(s)$ for each $s$. The other agent falsely thinks that he acts according to $\tilde{v}$, so he comes to believe that the fundamental is $\tilde{\theta}$ and takes the action $\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(s)$ for each $s$. The inequality says that the latter agent always acts less in accordance with $\tilde{v}$ than the former. Note that by the definition of $\pi$, the weak version of Inequality (8) trivially holds when $\tilde{v}$ is replaced by $v$ (i.e., $v(\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(s), s, \Theta) \leq v(\pi_{\Theta}(s), s, \Theta)$). Hence, a self-defeating self-view makes the agent worse off according to both $v$ and $\tilde{v}$.

**Proposition 2.** For any equi-directional problem in which $v$ and $\tilde{v}$ imply different optimal actions for all $s$ and $\theta$, the agent’s self-view is self-defeating.

Proposition 2 says that within the equi-directional class of environments, self-defeating learning occurs in any choice situation and for any type of decision-relevant naivete the agent may have. Hence, for instance, an incorrect self-view regarding intertemporal choice is self-defeating if the agent wants to be more patient than he is, and also if he wants to be less patient than he is. Intuitively, given that the agent does something different from what he expects, he must come to believe in reasons for exactly that kind of different behavior. This pushes his behavior further in the same unwanted direction.\(^{17}\)

### 3 Present Bias

#### 3.1 Setup

The agent’s period-$t$ incarnation, self $t$, chooses consumption $a_t \in \mathbb{R}$. His decision utility is

$$
v(a_t, s_t, \Theta) = u(a_t) + \phi_t a_t - \beta \kappa a_t,
$$

\(^{17}\) In an earlier paper, Heidhues et al. (2018), we also investigate conditions under which a misspecification about oneself is self-defeating. But there, the nature of the problem is completely different: the agent is misspecified about his production function rather than his preferences, he learns based on observing output rather than actions, he learns about the favorability of the state rather than directly about the effect of his actions, he has perfect rather than imperfect memory, and he has a single objective function. Consequently, the condition for his misspecification to be self-defeating is different, and arguably less economically interpretable than in the current model.
where $u : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ is a strictly concave function satisfying $\lim_{a \to -\infty} u'(a) = \infty$ and $\lim_{a \to \infty} u'(a) = -\infty$, $\phi_t = l\Theta + (1 - l)s_t$ for a constant $l \in (0,1)$, $\kappa \in \mathbb{R}$, and $\beta \in (0,1]$. At other times, the agent thinks that self $t$'s utility function is

$$\tilde{v}(a_t, s_t, \Theta) = u(a_t) + \phi_t a_t - \tilde{\beta} \kappa a_t,$$

where $\tilde{\beta} \in [\beta, 1]$. Just before period $t$, the agent would prefer to set $\beta = 1$, i.e., to maximize $u(a_t) + \phi_t a_t - \kappa a_t$. Our focus will be on the case $\beta < 1$ and $\tilde{\beta} > \beta$.

The above is a standard formulation of partially naive present bias for a situation where $u(a_t) + \phi_t a_t$ is the current utility from consumption and $\kappa a_t$ is the future harm. The agent discounts future consequences by the factor $\beta$ (Laibson, 1997, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), but believes that he is using the discount factor $\tilde{\beta}$ (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001). Because $\beta < 1$, he is present-biased in that he discounts more than he wishes. And because $\tilde{\beta} > \beta$, he is partially naive in that he overoptimistically thinks that he is less present-biased — or closer to his wished-for preference — than he actually is.

Accordingly, our formulation is consistent with typical applications of partially naive present bias. As straightforward examples, the action $a_t$ could represent how much the agent smokes, or how much he exercises. More subtly, if the agent faces a sequence of short-horizon consumption-savings problems, $a_t$ can represent how much of his liquid wealth he spends early in the problem at hand.$^{18}$ In the first and last of these examples, higher current consumption means lower future utility, so $\kappa > 0$. Since exercise is a beneficial activity, in that case $\kappa < 0$.

But beyond adopting the core structure of existing present-bias models, our formulation also incorporates the natural idea that instantaneous marginal utility is subject to uncertainty and shocks.$^{19}$ A simple interpretation is that marginal utility depends on permanent ($\Theta$) and temporary ($s_t$) factors. In a decision of whether to take a payday loan, for instance, $s_t$ could represent expenses that have come up so far this month, and $\Theta$ could represent the expectation of further expenses that will come up in the near future according to long-run trends. Alternatively, our specification

---

$^{18}$ Formally, suppose that each period $t$ involves two subperiods, $t.1$ and $t.2$. The agent has income $I$ to spend in the two subperiods. In subperiod $t.1$, he chooses consumption $a_t$ for that subperiod, leaving $I - a_t$ for subperiod $t.2$. At $t.1$, he evaluates subperiod $t.2$ as being in the future. His instantaneous utilities at $t.1$ and $t.2$ are $u(a_t) + \phi_t a_t$ and $\kappa(I - a_t)$, respectively. Other than the constant $\kappa I$, this yields our formulation above. We analyze additional predictions of this example in Appendix A.

$^{19}$ Fudenberg and Levine (2006) allow for utility shocks in the context of a dual-self model, but they do not incorporate misspecification or learning.
captures, in reduced form, signal-extraction situations in which the agent does not perfectly observe shocks to his utility. When deciding whether to go to a party, for instance, the agent may combine his prior about the types of parties he is invited to with a signal about the specific party.\footnote{To formalize such a signal-extraction situation, suppose that $d_t$ is the period-\(t\) benefit of consumption, the agent is attempting to maximize the expectation of \(u(a_t) + da_t - \beta ka_t\), and he thinks he is attempting to maximize the expectation of \(u(a_t) + da_t - \tilde{\beta} ka_t\). We let \(d_t = \Theta + \epsilon_{d,t}\), where the \(\epsilon_{d,t}\) are iid mean-zero normal random variables with variance \(\sigma_d^2\), and \(s_t = d_t + \epsilon_{s,t}\), where the \(\epsilon_{s,t}\) are iid mean-zero normal random variables with variance \(\sigma_s^2\). Then, defining \(l = \sigma_d^{-2}/(\sigma_d^{-2} + \sigma_s^{-2})\), we get \(E[d_t|s_t, \Theta] = l\Theta + (1 - l)s_t = \phi_t\), reducing the problem to the above formulation.}

3.2 Self-Defeating Naivete

We begin by demonstrating that naivete exacerbates present-biased behavior and is therefore self-defeating. To do so, we look for an SOE that satisfies Condition (2) in Observation 1. If the agent believes that the fundamental is $\tilde{\theta}$, then he chooses $a_t$ satisfying the first-order condition

$$-u'(a_t) = l\tilde{\theta} + (1 - l)s_t - \beta \kappa = l\tilde{\theta} + (1 - l)(\Theta + \epsilon_t) - \beta \kappa. \quad (9)$$

In contrast, he believes that if he receives the signal $\tilde{s}_t$, he chooses $\tilde{a}_t$ to satisfy

$$-u'(\tilde{a}_t) = l\tilde{\theta} + (1 - l)\tilde{s}_t - \beta \kappa. \quad (10)$$

Furthermore, he believes that $\tilde{s}_t = \tilde{\theta} + \epsilon_t$, so he believes the above equals

$$-u'(a_t) = l\tilde{\theta} + (1 - l)(\tilde{\theta} + \epsilon_t) - \beta \kappa. \quad (11)$$

Equating the right-hand sides of (9) and (11), we obtain an SOE belief $\tilde{\theta}$ at which the agent perfectly predicts his behavior.

**Proposition 3.** The agent’s beliefs converge a.s. to the unique SOE

$$\tilde{\theta} = \Theta + \frac{\beta - \beta}{1 - l} \kappa. \quad (12)$$

The SOE satisfies Condition (2), allowing the agent to perfectly predict his behavior. At the SOE,
the agent chooses consumption satisfying

\[
\frac{\partial v(a_t, s_t, \Theta)}{\partial a_t} = u'(a_t) + l\Theta + (1 - l)s_t - \beta\kappa = -\frac{l(\hat{\beta} - \beta)}{1 - l}\kappa.
\] (13)

Proposition 3 implies that for situations such as harmful consumption and spending (\(\kappa > 0\)), the agent ends up overestimating the average marginal utility from consumption (\(\tilde{\Theta} > \Theta\)). Intuitively, a most basic implication of partial naivete is that the agent starts out underestimating his average consumption. To explain the — to him surprisingly high — consumption levels he actually chooses, he revises his beliefs regarding the average marginal utility of consumption upwards. In addition, the more naive he is or the greater is the harm (i.e., the higher is \(\tilde{\beta}\) or \(\kappa\)), the more he mispredicts his behavior initially, so the more he revises his beliefs.

These revisions are detrimental for his behavior. By Equation (13), the agent’s long-run consumption is higher than it would be if he was correctly calibrated (\(\tilde{\beta} = \beta\)), it is higher than optimal from the perspective of the decisionmaking self’s actual preferences \(v\), and it is increasing in his naivete. Given his pre-existing tendency to overconsume — optimal consumption from the perspective of \(v\) is already higher than what the agent wishes just before period \(t\) — his mislearning therefore exacerbates his suboptimal behavior. This is a manifestation of the self-defeating learning we have identified in Proposition 2. As an example, suppose that in each period the agent chooses how many parties to go to and how long to stay, and he views parties as fun in the present but costly for the future. He starts off going to more parties than he expects, so he develops the self-view that he enjoys parties. As a result, he goes to too many parties, and stays too long, even from the perspective of his short-run, party-going self.

Reflecting the general message of Proposition 2, Proposition 3 implies that the agent’s inferences are self-defeating not only for harmful, but also for beneficial activities. If \(\kappa < 0\), then the agent underestimates the instantaneous utility, i.e., he overestimates the instantaneous disutility, of consumption. He may, for instance, develop the belief that exercise has large personal costs. This in turn exacerbates his tendency to exercise too little.

The above self-defeating inferences reflect a novel type of harm associated with naive present bias. Whereas in previous models naivete affects current behavior due to mispredictions regarding future behavior, in ours it does so due to mispredictions regarding the instantaneous utility function. As a consequence, in our setting the agent acts too impatiently from the perspective of his
present-biased preferences $v$ despite perfectly predicting his future behavior. Furthermore, while the previously known effect of mispredicting future behavior on current behavior is often small and can also be beneficial, in our equi-directional settings naivete is always detrimental. Hence, in real-life settings our model identifies an arguably more robustly harmful effect of naivete than do previous models.

3.3 Beliefs About Future Harm and Offsetting Benefits

In the above model of present-biased consumption, the uncertainty in the agent’s utility function pertains to current marginal utility. We now consider the obvious alternative that the uncertainty is about the future impact of consumption. For harmful products, the agent’s true and perceived utility functions are $v(a_t, s_t, \Theta) = u(a_t) - \beta e^{\phi_t} a_t$ and $\tilde{v}(a_t, s_t, \Theta) = u(a_t) - \tilde{\beta} e^{\phi_t} a_t$, respectively, where $e^{\phi_t} a_t$ is now the harm from consumption, and as before $\phi_t = l\Theta + (1 - l)s_t$ for some $l \in (0, 1)$. In a consumption-savings setting, for example, $\phi_t$ could be a measure of the likelihood or seriousness of a future contingency, such as a large expense or a period of unemployment, for which it is harmful to be unprepared. Similarly, $\phi_t$ could measure the impact of smoking on future utility, which combines negative health consequences as well as other effects, e.g., the benefit of concentrating on work.

For beneficial products, we define $v(a_t, s_t, \Theta) = u(a_t) + \beta e^{\phi_t} a_t$ and $\tilde{v}(a_t, s_t, \Theta) = u(a_t) + \tilde{\beta} e^{\phi_t} a_t$. In the context of exercise, for instance, $e^{\phi_t}$ could capture the future benefit of exercising now, which may include health benefits as well as the value of feeling or looking better.

**Proposition 4.** For both harmful and beneficial products, the agent’s beliefs converge a.s. to the unique SOE

$$\tilde{\theta} = \Theta - \frac{\ln \tilde{\beta} - \ln \beta}{1 - l}.$$

The SOE satisfies Condition (2), allowing the agent to perfectly predict his behavior.

Proposition 4 implies that the agent’s long-run belief about the future impact of increasing current consumption is biased toward zero. The agent may come to believe, for instance, that contingencies for which he might need to save rarely happen. Similarly, he may believe that smoking is not as harmful for him as for others, or that it has a benefit for concentration that offsets its negative health consequences. This underestimation of future consequences exacerbates the agent’s underweighting of the same consequences due to $\beta$, so for any $l > 0$ and both harmful
and beneficial products, naivete is again self-defeating. And again, suboptimal behavior occurs despite the agent perfectly predicting his behavior.

Despite a semblance of similarity, the agent’s long-run bias about the future is different from an optimistic bias due to anticipatory utility as modeled for instance by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and documented for instance by Oster et al. (2013). Whereas the predictions of anticipatory utility center on beliefs about the level of future utility, our predictions center on beliefs about the effect of consumption on the level of future utility. To see the contrast especially clearly, consider the implications of adding a term $h(\Theta, s_t)$ to both utility functions $v$ and $\tilde{v}$. This shifts the level of utility under different fundamentals, and hence which beliefs are more or less optimistic. But it leaves the agent’s real or perceived decisionmaking problem, and hence his behavior and his inferences from it, unchanged. In particular, suppose that $h(\theta, s_t) = -\tilde{v}(\tilde{\theta}(s_t), s_t, \theta)$, where $\tilde{\theta}$ is the SOE belief corresponding to the true fundamental $\Theta$. Then, the agent perceives his utility from his SOE action to be fixed, so he does not update about this utility. In the context of smoking, for instance, he may not update his view that smoking is harmful. To explain his behavior, then, he comes to believe that alternative courses of action are also harmful. Anticipatory utility does not predict such sad beliefs.

3.4 Behavior and Beliefs that Reveal Partial Naivete

The previous sections have shown that in a stable environment a partially naive present-biased agent can learn to account for and predict his behavior well — potentially perfectly — so in this first-pass sense he is realistic. We now show that upon closer inspection, his behavior and beliefs exhibit patterns that are distinct from those of a realistic agent.

Most importantly, the agent generally misforecasts how he will respond to a change in the environment. We start with changes in incentives associated with consumption. Consider the basic setup of Section 3.1, with the agent having converged to SOE beliefs. Suppose that just before period $t$, the agent learns about a surprise (temporary or permanent) change in $\kappa$. This does not affect his belief about the fundamental. Hence, from Equations (11) and (9), the responsivenesses of perceived and true consumption to the news equal

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{a}_t}{\partial \kappa} = \tilde{\beta}/u''(\tilde{a}_t)$$

and

$$\frac{\partial a_t}{\partial \kappa} = \beta/u''(a_t),$$

(14)
respectively. Because $\tilde{a}_t = a_t$ for any $\epsilon_t$, the former is greater than the latter at any point in the consumption distribution. Intuitively, despite predicting his behavior, the agent continues to overestimate how much weight he will put on the future, so he continues to overestimate how sensitive he will be to incentives stemming from a change in future consequences.\footnote{In Equation (14), the ratio of the agent’s perceived to his true reaction is exactly $\tilde{\beta}/\beta$, so that his misprediction accurately reveals his naivete. This is not a general prediction of our model. It is easy to construct examples in which the agent’s misprediction is more severe or less severe.}

For another reason, the agent also overestimates his response to a change in the current incentive to consume. Suppose, slightly extending our model, that current utility is $u(a_t) + \phi_t\kappa a_t$ for a constant $\kappa' > 0$, and the future harm is still $\kappa a_t$. For instance, $\phi_t$ might denote the effectiveness of smoking in reducing stress, and $\kappa'$ the importance of reducing stress in the agent’s life. Then, because the agent overestimates $\Theta$ and therefore also $\phi_t$, he overestimates his response to a change in $\kappa'$.\footnote{Precisely, at the median consumption level, the responsivenesses of the agent’s perceived and true consumption equal $\partial \tilde{a}_t/\partial \kappa' = -\hat{\theta}/u''(a_t)$ and $\partial a_t/\partial \kappa' = -(\hat{\theta} + (1 - l)\Theta)/u''(a_t)$, respectively.}

As an example, consider a partially naive agent who has been working on a high-pressure project at his job, and who smokes a lot. We can think of this as a situation with a combination of a high $\kappa'$ and a relatively low $\kappa$. A high $\kappa'$ captures that the benefit of stress reduction is high. A low $\kappa$ captures that there is an incentive to perform, so the benefit of concentration on one’s work is high, offsetting the negative health effects of smoking. According to our model, the agent correctly forecasts that he will continue to smoke a lot while the project lasts. At the same time, he overestimates how much he will cut back once the project comes to an end, i.e., when $\kappa'$ decreases and $\kappa$ increases. Existing models of partial naivete, in contrast, do not imply such a connection between overoptimism about cutting back and improvements in circumstances. In those models, the agent thinks that even in an unchanged environment, from the next period on he will be better-behaved.

The agent exhibits another misprediction when placed in a new, ex-ante identical environment in which another fundamental $\Theta$ is drawn independently. Then, he starts off mispredicting his behavior just like previously, as if he had not learned anything. In this sense, he learns to understand himself in a fixed environment, but his understanding does not transfer to other environments. He might repeatedly learn, for instance, that his cravings under the current diet are too strong to carry through with the regimen, but perpetually believe that the next type of diet will work. In contrast,
a correctly specified agent should learn his present-bias parameter $\beta$ and transfer this knowledge to other settings.

Our model also predicts patterns in beliefs that would seem puzzling from the perspective of a correctly specified model. At a basic level, the agent’s belief about the benefit of consuming a harmful product ($\tilde{\theta}$ in Equation (12)) responds positively to changes in the future cost of consumption ($\kappa$), although there is no logical relationship between the two properties. More subtly, beliefs about logically unrelated issues can exhibit systematic correlations. We have shown that a partially naive agent might come to overestimate the benefit or underestimate the relative harm of consuming a harmful product. Simple extensions of our methods imply that he can hold both biases at the same time (see Appendix C). He might, for example, believe both that smoking is beneficial for concentration and that other activities are harmful. Hence, our framework predicts that when looking at a population of agents with different levels of naivete (say, heterogeneity in $\tilde{\beta}$ given $\beta$), such different types of beliefs will be correlated.

Evidence from the context of smoking by Oakes et al. (2004) and Fotuhi et al. (2013) provides tentative support for our predictions regarding beliefs. Consistent with the overestimation of benefits, smokers are more likely than ex-smokers to think that smoking is joyful or helps with relaxation, socialization, or concentration. Consistent with the underestimation of future costs, smokers think that the health risks of smoking — which they generally understand and sometimes even overestimate (Viscusi, 1998) — do not apply specifically to them, or other activities are just as risky. And consistent with our prediction of correlated beliefs, these very different types of beliefs exhibit a significant positive correlation across individuals. While the first two raw patterns have a compelling standard explanation — those who have more favorable beliefs about smoking are more likely to smoke — the last pattern does not. In a Bayesian model in which individuals receive independent signals about the different dimensions of utility, correlations of zero would seem most plausible.

### 3.5 Apparent Sophistication

In this subsection, we identify important implications of our theory for the empirical literature (reviewed in Ericson and Laibson, 2019) on whether individuals are sophisticated in intertemporal choice. The general approach in the literature measures a person’s degree of sophistication in a
situation by how well he predicts his own behavior in that situation. The models above raise immediate doubt about this approach. At the SOE, our agent predicts his behavior perfectly, yet he neither understands himself, nor acts optimally given his time inconsistency. Hence, while the literature’s prediction test would brand him as sophisticated, his predictive ability is better described as apparent sophistication rather than real sophistication.

Although the possibility of apparent sophistication is not considered in existing work, in the rest of this subsection we develop the case that it is empirically relevant. Most importantly, we argue that findings on the sophistication of payday-loan borrowers by Allcott et al. (2022) are better explained by our model than by a model of correctly specified learning.

To capture their setting in our framework, we start from the model in Section 3.1. We think of the agent as taking a payday loan just before each period $t$, define $a_t$ as his consumption in period $t$ — which determines whether he rolls over his loan — and assume that $\kappa a_t$ with $\kappa > 0$ is the future cost of loan repayment. But we augment this model with two additional choices the agent makes going into period $t$ (hence before observing $s_t$). He (i) reports his subjective expectation of $a_t$, and (ii) reveals how much he values a marginal uniform decrease of $a_t$, where the latter value is derived from the goal to maximize the expectation of the undiscounted utility $u(a_t) + \phi_t a_t - \kappa a_t$. We call the agent inexperienced if $t = 1$, and experienced if his beliefs have converged and are thus given by the SOE.

Suppose that an observer (she) has access to the above data (mean consumption $a_t$ as well as (i) and (ii)) for an infinite sample of inexperienced agents as well as an infinite sample of experienced agents. In reality, all agents have the same $u$, $\beta$, $\tilde{\beta}$, prior distribution of $\Theta$, variance $\sigma_\epsilon^2$ of $s_t$, and $\kappa$, so there is no sampling error in estimation. The observer knows $u$ and $\kappa$, and assumes that the agents also know $\Theta$ and $\sigma_\epsilon^2$. The latter corresponds to the usual assumption that agents know their instantaneous utility functions. The observer is interested in inferring each group’s $\beta$ and $\tilde{\beta}$, allowing for the possibility that these (as well as the distribution of $\Theta$ and $\sigma_\epsilon^2$) differ across groups. If she can find a unique $\beta$ and $\tilde{\beta}$ that (along with other parameters) perfectly explain

23 Formally, suppose that before observing $s_t$, the agent expects to choose the action $\tilde{\pi}_{\mu_t}(s_t)$. Then, (i) equals $E_{\mu_t} [\tilde{\pi}_{\mu_t}(s_t)]$, and (ii) equals $C'(0)$, where $C(\Delta)$ is the agent’s willingness to pay to choose $\tilde{\pi}_{\mu_t}(s_t) - \Delta$ instead of $\tilde{\pi}_{\mu_t}(s_t)$. Empirical methods for eliciting (i) and (ii) are detailed in Allcott et al. (2022). The more tricky valuation (ii) can be elicited by measuring the agent’s willingness to pay for incentives to decrease consumption.

24 Note also that the predicted mean consumption and value of a marginal decrease in consumption at time $t$ only depend on the “public” belief $\mu_t$ at the beginning of the period, which is common knowledge among all later selves. Thus, even if these additional “actions” are remembered by the agent, they will not influence his beliefs.

24 In practice, the observer would have to infer the shape of $u$ from behavior. This is irrelevant for our analysis,
her data for a group, then she infers that these are the group’s parameters; otherwise, she rejects her model. The following proposition identifies the observer’s conclusions:

**Proposition 5.** The observer does not reject her incorrect model, and (i) for inexperienced agents correctly estimates the true parameters $\beta$, $\tilde{\beta}$, while (ii) for experienced agents she estimates the true parameter $\tilde{\beta}$, but incorrectly infers that the agent is sophisticated, i.e., that $\beta = \tilde{\beta}$.

When the agent is inexperienced, the observer understands him correctly. But when he is experienced, she thinks of him exactly what he thinks of himself: that he is sophisticated with a present-bias parameter of $\tilde{\beta}$. The logic for the second result is in two parts. First, the observer can infer $\tilde{\beta}$ from the agent’s willingness to pay to decrease consumption $a_t$. Since this depends only on the agent’s belief about how he will treat the future, and hence not on his belief about the fundamental, the inference is correct. Second, the observer can infer the agent’s degree of naivete from his bias in predicting his own behavior. Since he predicts his behavior perfectly, the observer concludes that he is sophisticated, so that his present-bias parameter must be $\tilde{\beta}$.

A model of correct learning about present bias and our model of misspecified learning therefore have distinctly different predictions as to what happens as learning unfolds. In the former case, the agent’s belief adjusts downwards to his true present bias. In the latter case, in contrast, the agent’s measured level of present bias adjusts upwards to his belief. Supporting our model, the central structural finding in Allcott et al. (2022, Table 3) is much closer to the latter prediction than to the former one: inexperienced borrowers’ measured $\beta$ and $\tilde{\beta}$ are 0.73 and 0.92, respectively, whereas for experienced borrowers both measures equal 0.86.

Consider also the finding of Le Yaouanq and Schwardmann (2022) that subjects in a laboratory experiment quickly become better at predicting their own willingness to work. The authors find strong evidence that subjects learn about the cost of effort, and weaker evidence that they learn about present bias. This is consistent with an explanation Allcott et al. propose for their own findings within the realm of correctly specified learning: that subjects were sophisticated all along, and the reduced misprediction of future behavior is due to learning about the utility cost of repayment. But analogously to the payday example, it is entirely possible that the combination of

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25 These are estimates for risk-neutral borrowers, which according to the paper’s definition our agent is.
facts is at least in part due to our explanation: that subjects remained partially naive all along, and they mislearned about their cost of effort.\footnote{Our model, however, does not explain another puzzling fact in Le Yaouanc and Schwardmann (2022), that subjects underestimate their future change in beliefs after taking an unexpected action.}

In addition, further patterns are inconsistent with models of correctly specified learning and naturally predicted by ours. First, Allcott et al. (2022) report that much like their inexperienced counterparts, experienced borrowers overestimate their response to a monetary incentive to reduce borrowing in the future. Since a new incentive is equivalent to an increase in the harm $\kappa$ of consumption, our model predicts exactly such an overestimation (see Expressions (14)).

Second, our model’s prediction regarding the non-transferability of learning across environments (Section 3.4) helps interpret the literature on sophistication as a whole. In particular, this prediction reconciles the above theme that in some isolated settings individuals’ predictions about their own behavior improve quickly (see also Allcott et al., 2021, Carrera et al., 2022) with another major theme: that in a variety of other, especially unfamiliar situations many individuals are quite naive (Skiba and Tobacman, 2008, Acland and Levy, 2015, Fang and Wang, 2015, Fedyk, 2021, Augenblick and Rabin, 2019, Chaloupka et al., 2019, Carrera et al., 2022, John, 2020, Bai et al., forthcoming, Kuchler and Pagel, 2021). In reconciling these findings, our model also says that the former ones may be due to apparent sophistication, making the latter ones more informative about individuals’ naivete. From the perspective of a correctly specified model, in contrast, the two themes are arguably contradictory. Based on such conventional logic, if a person quickly learns about his present bias in many situations, then he should quickly develop an accurate understanding of his average present bias, so by adulthood he should not be systematically biased in new situations.\footnote{This is true even if present bias varies from situation to situation. It may be the case, for instance, that a person’s $\beta$ is drawn from a distribution independently for each situation. Then, the type of quick learner suggested by the above experiments should arguably learn about the distribution, and come to an accurate understanding of his average behavior.}

Importantly, the observer’s misunderstanding of an experienced agent in Proposition 5 leads her to overly optimistic conclusions about multiple aspects of his behavior. She thinks that his level of $a_t$ (in the payday example, his loan renewal) reflects sophisticated present bias with a parameter of $\tilde{\beta}$. In contrast, self-defeating naivete means that this level is actually higher than that implied by sophisticated present bias with a parameter of $\beta$. The observer also thinks that the agent’s willingness to pay to lower $a_t$ (i.e., to repay the loan early) is correct. In contrast, it is too low. Intuitively, although the agent correctly predicts his behavior, he overestimates his marginal utility
of consumption, so he underestimates the value of decreasing consumption. Finally, the observer
would presumably guess that an earlier consumption decision (i.e., a decision of whether to take
a payday loan in the first place) also reflects a present bias of $\tilde{\beta}$. In Appendix A, we extend our
model to allow for such a decision, and show that here too the agent acts more impatiently.

3.6 Learning Process and Addiction-Like Behavior

Having analyzed properties of the agent’s long-run behavior, we now study his learning process and
behavior away from the limit. Although we assume that consumption is not addictive — it does not
feature physiological or other history dependence of instantaneous utility — our model generates
some consumption patterns that resemble those in models of addiction. For addictive products,
therefore, the mechanisms we identify can amplify and modify addictive patterns described in
previous research. And our model says that a person may display signs of addiction even for
products that are not physically addictive.

We take our model of harmful consumption from Section 3.1 (where $\kappa > 0$). To keep our
analysis tractable, we assume, like much of the literature on addiction starting from Becker and
Murphy (1988), that utility is quadratic: $u(a) = -a^2/2$. We denote the consumption level the agent
chooses by $a_t = \arg \max_a E_{\mu_t}[v(a, s_t, \theta)|s_t]$, and in slight abuse of notation write $a_t(s_t, a_{t-1})$ for the
action as a function of past actions $a_{t-1} = (a_1, \ldots, a_{t-1})$ and the current signal $s_t$. Analogously,
we denote the optimal consumption level from the perspective of self $t$’s utility function $v$ by
$a^*_t = \arg \max_a E[v(a, s_t, \theta)|s_t, a_{t-1}]$. Proposition 6 characterizes the agent’s behavior:

**Proposition 6.** Suppose that $\tilde{\beta} > \beta$.

I. Given any signal $s_t$,

$$\frac{\partial a_t(s_t, a_{t-1})}{\partial a_{t-1}} > \frac{\partial a_t(s_t, a_{t-2})}{\partial a_{t-2}} > \cdots > \frac{a_t(s_t, a_{1})}{\partial a_{1}} > 0.$$  

II. For any $t \geq 2$, self $t$ overestimates the state ($E_{\mu_t}[^{\Theta}] > E[^{\Theta}|s^t]$), and overconsumes ($a_t > a^*_t$).

Furthermore, his overconsumption $a_t - a^*_t$ is strictly increasing in $\kappa$.

III. The agent’s ex-ante expected consumption $E_{\mu_t}[a_t] = \text{strictly increasing in } t$, with $E_{\mu_t}[a_t] - E_{\mu_1}[a_{t-1}]$ strictly increasing in $\kappa$. His ex-ante belief regarding the expected $a_t$ is constant in $t$.

Part I says that just like in the intertemporal-complementarities approach to addiction (e.g.,
Becker and Murphy, 1988, Orphanides and Zervos, 1995, Gruber and Köszegi, 2001), the agent’s current consumption is increasing in his past consumption. In previous models, this “backward-looking intertemporal complementarity” occurs because higher past consumption raises the marginal utility of current consumption. In our model, it occurs because higher past consumption indicates to the agent that his marginal utility had been higher in the past, raising his belief about the marginal utility of current consumption. Since future circumstances are not informative about current marginal utility, however, our theory does not generate the prediction — tightly connected under the intertemporal-complementarities approach — that consumption in a period is sensitive to prices in future periods. Consistent with our model, backward-looking intertemporal complementarity is widely documented, but the latter “forward-looking intertemporal complementarity” has received only mixed support.

While Part I also holds for a correctly specified agent, Parts II and III only hold for a misspecified agent. Part II generalizes what we have seen in Proposition 3 for long-run behavior: in every period \( t \geq 2 \), the agent overestimates his marginal utility of consumption and therefore overconsumes. This property is consistent with clinical definitions of harmful addictions, which suggest that addicts’ high consumption is not worth the cost. It is also similar to the mistaken overconsumption in the cue-triggered consumption model of Bernheim and Rangel (2004). In Bernheim and Rangel’s model, however, mistaken overconsumption is exogenously assumed rather than derived.

Part III says that the misspecified agent’s average consumption is increasing over time, but he does not anticipate this addiction-like process. Increasing consumption also occurs naturally in models of intertemporal complementarities, but the mechanism is again different. In previous models, the agent accumulates a stock of past consumption that increases the marginal utility of consumption — which is a process he understands unless he has another bias, such as projection bias (as in Loewenstein et al., 2003). In our setting, instead, the agent accumulates misinferences, so it is only his beliefs about the marginal utility of consumption that keep rising — which is a process he fails to understand even without any additional biases.

Finally, the last two patterns are increasing in the harm of consumption \( \kappa \). If the product is more harmful, then the agent mispredicts his behavior by more, so he makes greater mistakes.

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28 Becker et al. (1994) and Gruber and Köszegi (2001) document evidence consistent with forward-looking intertemporal complementarity, but Rees-Jones and Rozema (2020) argue that this could be due to other factors, and Liu et al. (1999), Petruzzello (2019), and Allcott et al. (2021) do not find evidence of forward-looking intertemporal complementarity.
in inferring his instantaneous utility. Hence, our model says that when it comes to patterns of addiction, it is not only the addictiveness of the product that matters, but also its harm. More generally, we predict that a person may display patterns of addictive behavior even for harmful goods that are not physically addictive (i.e., do not feature intertemporal complementarities).

In fact, the effect of \( \kappa \) identifies a prediction of our model that is distinct from the predictions of all other models. Suppose that the agent has been making choices under the assumption that the harm from consumption \( \kappa \) would remain unchanged forever. But just before period \( t \), \( \kappa \) suddenly rises, and the agent expects it to remain at the new level forever. This may capture, for example, an instance when new and definitive scientific evidence regarding the harm of smoking becomes public. Then:

**Corollary 1.** The agent’s short-run (period-\( t \)) response to an increase in the harm \( \kappa \) is greater than his long-run (SOE) response.

The intuition derives from the agent’s failure to predict his response to a change in incentives. Since his reaction to the increase in \( \kappa \) is smaller than he expects, he gradually becomes more convinced that consumption is beneficial, so his consumption rebounds. This also implies that informational interventions regarding the harm of consumption (such as an informational intervention regarding how unhealthy cigarettes are) are at least partially offset by mislearning. In models of intertemporal complementarities, in contrast, the short-run decrease in consumption lowers marginal utility and hence leads to a greater long-run response.

While we have not found precise evidence on the above prediction, a puzzling combination of findings does seem suggestive. Based on smokers’ long-run smoking responses to health information, Ippolito and Ippolito (1984, Table 3) estimate that (depending on the discount rate) smokers value their lives at \( \$0.46-2.44 \) million on average; but based on labor-market data, Viscusi and Hersch (2008) report that smokers value their lives at \( \$7.32 \) million on average (all numbers in \$2006). The offset effect behind Corollary 1 explains why these numbers are so different: the agent responds to health information by developing beliefs that lower the effect of the information, so he displays too little sensitivity to the information. Since labor-market choices largely trade off future compensation
with future risks, there is no mislearning of the same type.\textsuperscript{29,30}

\section{Conclusion}

In this paper, we have as a first step analyzed equi-directional problems. In ongoing work, we study settings where equi-directionality is not a plausible general assumption. As an example, suppose that the agent needs to allocate work between now and later, \(s_t\) describes how busy he is right now, and \(\Theta\) describes how busy he is on average. Then, a higher \(s_t\) means that he should work less now, but a higher \(\Theta\) means that he should work more now. In such settings, naivete can benefit the agent in an extreme sense: he may come to behave as if he was time-consistent and correctly learned the fundamental, despite neither of these being true. Since he underweights his future busyness when deciding how much to work, he tends to put off working. Given his naivete, he interprets this behavior as indicating that he is often rather busy. On an average day, therefore, he believes that he is less busy than usual, and is willing to work a decent amount — exactly as a time-consistent agent would. In this sense, misspecified learning from one’s own actions can reverse O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (1999) prediction that naivete is extremely harmful in task-completion decisions. We also conjecture, however, that in such a rich environment, the implications of naivete can be extremely sensitive to details of the problem.

While we have focused on intertemporal choice, our framework applies to other settings where a person underestimates his undesirable motives. An important case in point is cognitive dissonance, the topic of a large literature starting from Festinger (1957). In the language of our setup, cognitive

\textsuperscript{29} Note that present bias is in itself insufficient to explain the lower value of life estimated from smoking decisions. Ippolito and Ippolito (1984) estimate the value from comparing consumers’ sensitivities to health information and to prices. To the extent that consumers evaluate a payment as future disutility — a plausible assumption for consumers who are not budget constrained — present bias drops out in such a comparison. If — implausibly — consumers evaluate payments entirely as current utility, the value of life estimated from responses to information should be \(\beta\) times the value estimated from labor-market tradeoffs. The proportion, however, is much lower than existing estimates of \(\beta\).

\textsuperscript{30} Empirically, long-run and short-run responses are often compared by looking at the effects of a period’s price change over time. Supporting the intertemporal-complementarities model, research based on this approach tends to find that long-run responses are greater than short-run responses. Whether these findings are consistent with our model depends on details of how the agent treats a price change. One possibility is that he does not fully account for past prices when interpreting past consumption (formally, the effect of a price change is treated as part of the shock \(s_t\)). Then, by Proposition 6 our model makes the same prediction as the intertemporal-complementarities approach, so it is consistent with the evidence. Another possibility is that the agent fully accounts for past prices when interpreting past consumption. If in addition he evaluates payments as future disutility, then a permanent price change is equivalent to a change in \(\kappa\). This means that our model makes the opposite prediction than the intertemporal-complementarities approach, and is therefore inconsistent with the empirical findings.
dissonance arises when a person makes a decision that — having been driven by his preferences $v$ — feels inconsistent with the preferences $\tilde{v}$ he thinks he has. A financial advisor may, for instance, be induced to lie about a high-commission financial product to his client, creating tension with the self-view that he does not tell lies. Similarly, self-interest may induce a person to cheat on taxes, creating tension with the self-view that he cares about others. The psychology literature documents that in such situations, people adjust their beliefs to render their behavior more consistent with their self-views. The financial advisor might, for instance, come to believe that the product is actually appropriate for his client, and the tax evader might come to believe that his money would be wasted by corrupt politicians. Our SOE can be seen as identifying the steady-state consequences of cognitive dissonance: not only are beliefs modified to be consistent with behavior, but behavior is consistent with beliefs. The advisor may, for example, adjust his own investment strategy if his distorted beliefs overestimate the returns of an asset he widely recommends; and the person cheating on taxes may start favoring politicians who limit the size of government.

Another application of SOE is implicit bias or prejudice. We can conceptualize an implicitly biased person as someone who consciously endorses egalitarian views with respect to other groups, but acts based on negative attitudes that he is not aware of. To explain why he acts in a biased way, such a person develops the belief that the other group is less deserving in some way. Our SOE-based theory thus predicts that among people who view themselves as egalitarian, inaccurate statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination are positively correlated. Due to this combination, the agent acts in a more biased manner than if he was honest to himself about his bias. Accordingly, pressure to endorse egalitarian attitudes on the surface can make a person more prejudicial in his behavior. Conversely, however, just making a person aware of his subconscious prejudice can mitigate his biased behavior even absent eliminating the prejudice itself.

References


Appendix: Short-Horizon Consumption-Savings Example

Consider an agent who repeatedly faces a short-horizon consumption-savings problem. Each period $t$ is divided into three subperiods, $t.0$, $t.1$, $t.2$. The agent is a partially naive quasi-hyperbolic discounter who discount future utility by $\beta$ while thinking that all other selves use $\tilde{\beta}$.

At $t.0$, the agent receives income $I$ and decides how much to spend on consumption $c_t$, which yields instantaneous utility $u_0(c_t)$. In subperiod $t.1$, the agent chooses consumption $a_t$, which gives instantaneous utility $u_1(a_t) = u(a_t) + \phi_t a_t$. We assume that $\phi_t$ is determined exactly as in our main model in Section 3.1, that the agent observes the signal $s_t$ at the beginning of subperiod $t.1$, and that $u_0(c_t)$ and $u_1(a_t)$ are twice-differentiable, strictly concave utility functions with a marginal utility approaching $\infty$ (respectively $-\infty$) as its argument goes to $-\infty$ (respectively $\infty$). Finally, in period $t.2$ the agent enjoys utility $u_2(I - c_t - a_t) = I - c_t - a_t$. This quasi-linear specification of utility in subperiod $t.2$ closely resembles our basic model with linear harm.

In subperiod $t.1$, for a given signal $s_t$ and posterior belief $\mu_t$, the agent hence maximizes

$$\max_{a_t} u_1(a_t) + \bar{\phi}(s_t, \mu_t) a_t + \beta(I - c_t - a_t),$$

where the agent’s posterior (mean) belief $\bar{\phi}(s_t, \mu_t)$ as a function of $s_t$ and $\mu_t$ is formally stated in (22). In any other (sub-)period the agent thinks he has or will use $\tilde{\beta}$ instead of $\beta$ in the above maximization. Solving the first-order conditions yields the exact same policy functions as in the model of Section 3.1, i.e.:

$$\pi_{\mu_t}(s_t) = (u')^{-1}(\beta \kappa - \bar{\phi}(s_t, \mu_t))$$

$$\bar{\pi}_{\mu_t}(s_t) = (u')^{-1}(\tilde{\beta} \kappa - \bar{\phi}(s_t, \mu_t)).$$

The policy functions are independent of $c_t$, and because $c_t$ reveals no information about the fundamental, the agent updates his beliefs about $\Theta$ exactly as in the model of Section 3.1.

In subperiod $t.0$, the agent maximizes

$$\max_{c_t} u_0(c_t) + \beta \tilde{E}_{\mu_t}[u_1(a_t) + \phi_t a_t + \beta(I - c_t - a_t)],$$

where the subjective expectation is based on the agent’s current belief $\mu_t$ regarding the fundamental

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31 The specification of consumption in subperiod $t.2$ amounts to assuming that the gross interest rate is 1.
and the presumption that his future self uses policy function \( \tilde{\pi}_{t}(s_t) \). Because this policy function, and hence the anticipated choice of \( a_t \), is independent of \( c_t \), the agent chooses \( c_t = (u'_0)^{-1}(\beta) \). Moreover, it follows from the equivalence of choices and beliefs in subperiods \( 1 \) to those of our model in Section 3.1 that the agent overconsumes even from self \( 0 \)'s perspective.

Because the outside observer’s econometric estimates are derived from choices at \( 0 \) and predictions and commitment choices about them, the fact that there is a decision at \( 0 \) does not change the observer’s estimates. The outside observer, hence, incorrectly concludes that the agent is sophisticated with a present-bias parameter \( \tilde{\beta} \). The observer, thus, incorrectly anticipates the agent to — from a long-run perspective — (over-)consume less in subperiod \( 0 \); she anticipates an experienced agent to choose a consumption level \( (u'_0)^{-1}(\tilde{\beta}) \) instead of \( c_t = (u'_0)^{-1}(\beta) \). Furthermore, despite correctly predicting her subperiod-\( 0 \) behavior, the agent overconsumes in \( 0 \) and \( 1 \) also from the \( \tilde{\beta} \)-preference perspective.

Consider next an extension in which the \( u_0(c_t) = u(c_t) + \phi_t c_t \), so that the agent’s learning about the marginal utility of consumption applies equally to subperiods \( 0 \) and \( 1 \). We suppose the remainder of the model remains specified as above. In particular, we still suppose that the agent observes \( s_t \) at the beginning of subperiod \( 1 \). This implies that his choice at subperiod \( 0 \) contains no information about the fundamental, so learning about the fundamental continues to take place as above. Furthermore, since the agent’s \( 1 \)-policy functions above are independent of \( c_t \), behavior in \( 1 \) remains unaltered. In subperiod \( 0 \), the agent now chooses consumption such that

\[
E_{\mu_t}[u'_0(c_t)] = u'(c_t) + E_{\mu_t}[\phi_t] = \beta.
\]

Because an agent with SOE beliefs overestimates the marginal utility of consumption, she now overconsumes in subperiod \( 0 \) (as well as in subperiod \( 1 \)) even from self \( 0 \)'s perspective; that is she chooses \( c_t = (u')^{-1}(\beta - \tilde{\theta}) > (u')^{-1}(\beta - \Theta) \). Our above outside observer with access to period \( 1 \) choices as well as predictions and commitments regarding these, would underpredict this overconsumption.

B Appendix: Proofs

We denote by \( \sigma^2 \) the variance of the shocks \( (s_t)_t \). Throughout of the appendix, we use the notation \( (\epsilon_t)_t \) for the sequence of shocks and \( \epsilon^t = (\epsilon_1, \ldots, \epsilon_t) \) for the vector of length \( t \) of past realizations of shocks. We label the sequence and past realizations of actions, signals, perceived signals, and beliefs analogously.
Below, we denote by $\mathbb{P}[\cdot]$ the (objective) probability measure over beliefs induced by (6) given the fundamental $\Theta$, and by $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$ the corresponding (objective) expectation.

### B.1 Belief Dynamics

We begin by describing the dynamics of the agent’s belief. For the sake of doing so and establishing the conversion argument, it is convenient to normalize the policy functions as being increasing in the signal (respectively perceived signal). If, as in some of our applications, the policy functions are decreasing we can just re-normalize the signal by multiplying it with minus one.

Since the agent’s prior is Normally distributed and the signals are Normally distributed, if the agent believes that the sequence of past signals was equal to $\tilde{s}_{t-1}$ his posterior belief $\mu_t$ is also Normally distributed. We denote by $\tilde{\theta}_t$ the posterior mean and by $\sigma_t^2$ the posterior variance of the posterior belief $\mu_t$. It is well known that

$$\tilde{\theta}_t = \frac{\sigma_1^{-2}\theta_1 + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}\sum_{r=1}^{t-1} \tilde{s}_r}{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}(t-1)}$$

$$\sigma_t^2 = \frac{1}{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}(t-1)} .$$

(15)

Furthermore, as the posterior belief is Normal the posterior mean equals the log-likelihood maximizer defined in (7), which is why we denote them with the same symbol. The dynamics of the posterior mean can be rewritten as

$$\tilde{\theta}_t = \frac{\sigma_1^{-2}\theta_1 + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}\sum_{r=1}^{t-2} \tilde{s}_r}{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}(t-1)} + \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^{-2}\tilde{s}_{t-1}}{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}(t-1)} = \frac{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}(t-2)}{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}(t-1)} \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^{-2}}{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}(t-1)} \tilde{s}_{t-1}$$

$$= \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_t^2}{\sigma_\epsilon^2} (\tilde{s}_{t-1} - \tilde{\theta}_{t-1}).$$

(16)

To prove Proposition 1, we first prove several auxiliary results about the behavior of the agent’s beliefs. We define $\theta_t$ to be the mean of the belief an outside observer would hold after observing the true signals $s^{t-1}$ when starting from the same prior $\mu_1$ as the agent, i.e.

$$\theta_t = \frac{\sigma_1^{-2}\theta_1 + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}\sum_{r=1}^{t-1} s_r}{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}(t-1)} .$$

Our next result establishes that the distance between the mean of the agent’s belief and that of an

\[32\] See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conjugate_prior#When_likelihood_function_is_a_continuous_distribution.
outside observer is uniformly bounded.

**Lemma 1.** If \(|s_r - \tilde{s}_r| \leq c\) for all \(r\) then \(|\theta_t - \tilde{\theta}_t| < c\).

**Proof.** We get that the difference between \(\tilde{\theta}_t\) and \(\theta_t\) is uniformly bounded:

\[
|\theta_t - \tilde{\theta}_t| = \left| \frac{\sigma_{\epsilon}^{-2} \sum_{r=1}^{t-1} (s_r - \tilde{s}_r)}{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_{\epsilon}^{-2} (t - 1)} \right| \leq \frac{\sigma_{\epsilon}^{-2} \sum_{r=1}^{t-1} |s_r - \tilde{s}_r|}{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_{\epsilon}^{-2} (t - 1)} \leq c \frac{\sigma_{\epsilon}^{-2} (t - 1)}{\sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_{\epsilon}^{-2} (t - 1)} < c.
\]

We next use this insight to establish that the distance between the subjective mean belief of the agent \(\tilde{\theta}_t\) and the true fundamental \(\Theta\) will be a.s. bounded in the long-run.

**Lemma 2.** If \(|s_r - \tilde{s}_r| \leq c\) for all \(r\) then \(\limsup_{t \to \infty} |\Theta - \tilde{\theta}_t| \leq c\) with probability 1.

**Proof.** The strong law of large numbers implies that the mean belief \((\theta_t)_t\) of an outside observer who observes the signals \(s_1, s_2, \ldots\) almost surely converges to the true fundamental \(\Theta\), and the result then follows directly from Lemma 1.

To simplify notation, we define \(\tilde{y}_t = \sigma_{\epsilon}^{-2} [\tilde{s}_t - \tilde{\theta}_t]\) and note that given this definition, the dynamics of \(\tilde{\theta}\) are given by

\[
\tilde{\theta}_{t+1} = \tilde{\theta}_t + \sigma_{\epsilon}^2 \tilde{y}_t.
\]

Our next result establishes that the variance of \(\tilde{y}_t\) can be uniformly bounded.

**Lemma 3.** If \(|s_r - \tilde{s}_r| \leq c\) for all \(r\) then \(\sup_t \mathbb{E} [\tilde{y}_t^2] \leq \sigma_{\epsilon}^{-4} (2c + \sigma_{\epsilon} + \sigma_1)^2 < \infty\).

**Proof.** We have that

\[
\sigma_{\epsilon}^2 |\tilde{y}_t| = |\tilde{s}_t - \tilde{\theta}_t| \leq c + |s_t - \tilde{\theta}_t| \leq 2c + |s_t - \theta_t| \leq 2c + |s_t - \Theta| + |\Theta - \theta_t|.
\]

By the triangle inequality for the \(L^2\) norm, we thus have that

\[
\sigma_{\epsilon}^2 \sqrt{\mathbb{E} [|\tilde{y}_t|^2]} \leq 2c + \sqrt{\mathbb{E} [|s_t - \Theta|^2]} + \sqrt{\mathbb{E} [|\Theta - \theta_t|^2]} = 2c + \sigma_{\epsilon} + \sqrt{\mathbb{E} [|\Theta - \theta_t|^2]} \leq 2c + \sigma_{\epsilon} + \sqrt{\sigma_1^2},
\]

where the equality follows as \(s_t\) is Normally distributed with mean \(\Theta\) and variance \(\sigma_1^2\); and the final inequality follows since the expected squared distance between \(\Theta\) and the posterior mean of an outside observer \(\theta_t\), equals the posterior variance given in (15) and is monotone decreasing in \(t\) and consequently maximized at time 1 when it equals the prior variance \(\sigma_1^2\).
Recall that future selves of the agent believe that the signal $\tilde{s}_t$ the time $t$ self has observed is given by $\tilde{s}_t = \tilde{\pi}^{-1}_t(\mu_t(st))$. We next define the function $\tilde{g} : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ as the objective expectation of an outside observer of $\tilde{y}_t$ if $\mu_t = \delta_{\tilde{\theta}}$, i.e. the agent is subjectively certain the fundamental equals $\tilde{\theta}$,

$$\tilde{g}(\tilde{\theta}) = \sigma^{-2}_\epsilon \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \tilde{\pi}^{-1}_\tilde{\theta}(\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(st)) \right] - \tilde{\theta} \right). \tag{18}$$

We furthermore denote by $\gamma_t$ the difference between the true expectation of $\tilde{y}_t$ and $\tilde{g}(\tilde{\theta}_t)$

$$\gamma_t = \mathbb{E} \left[ \tilde{y}_t | s^{t-1} \right] - \tilde{g}(\tilde{\theta}_t) = \sigma^{-2}_\epsilon \mathbb{E} \left[ \tilde{\pi}^{-1}_\mu(\pi_{\mu}(s_t)) - \tilde{\pi}^{-1}_\tilde{\theta}(\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(s_t)) \right].$$

**Lemma 4.** We have that $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sigma^2_t |\gamma_t| < \infty$.

**Proof.** By Assumption 3 there exists constants $c_1, c_2 > 0$ such that $|\gamma_t| \leq c_1 t^{-c_2}$. Hence,

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sigma^2_t |\gamma_t| \leq \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{c_1 t^{-c_2}}{t^{-2} \sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_2^{-2} \epsilon (t-1)} \leq \frac{c_1}{\sigma_1^{-2}} + \frac{c_1}{\sigma_2^{-2}} \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \frac{1}{t-1} t^{-c_2} \leq \frac{c_1}{\sigma_2^{-2}} \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} (t-1)^{-(1+c_2)} < \infty. \quad \square$$

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Recall that the agent’s posterior mean equals his subjective log-likelihood maximizer $\tilde{\theta}_t$. Note also that by Assumption 2 the difference between the true signal $s_t$ and the signal the agent believes to have observed $\tilde{s}_t$ is uniformly bounded by $c$. The dynamic of $\tilde{\theta}$ is given by

$$\tilde{\theta}_{t+1} = \tilde{\theta}_t + \sigma^2_{t+1} \tilde{y}_t. \tag{19}$$

We will next use a result on the limit behavior of processes with the above dynamic by Kushner and Yin (2003, page 126-128) and begin by verifying the conditions necessary to apply their theorem. By Lemma 3, Condition A2.1 of Kushner and Yin is satisfied. As $\sigma^2_t$ vanishes of the order $1/t$, Condition A2.4 of Kushner and Yin is satisfied. As $\tilde{g}$ is continuous and $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sigma^2_t |\gamma_t| < \infty$, Condition A2.3 and A2.5 of Kushner and Yin are satisfied. By Lemma 2, $\tilde{\theta}_t$ is eventually in $[\Theta - c, \Theta + c]$ and $(\theta_t)_t$ is a.s. bounded. Furthermore, as $\tilde{g}$ is continuous and $\tilde{\theta} \in \mathbb{R}$, Condition A2.6 of Kushner and Yin holds. We can apply Theorem 2.1 from Kushner and Yin (2003, page 127), which yields that $\tilde{\theta}_t$ converges a.s. to a connected subset $S$ for which $\tilde{g}(\tilde{\theta}) = 0$ for all $\tilde{\theta} \in S$.

We next argue that this condition characterizes exactly the set of self-observation equilibria.
Note that by Definition 1 and as $f(\epsilon) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}} e^{-\epsilon^2/(2\sigma^2)}$ an SOE $\tilde{\theta}$ is characterized by

$$\tilde{\theta} = \arg\max_z \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \log f \left( \tilde{\pi}_\theta^{-1}(\pi(\theta)) - z \right) f(s - \theta) ds$$

$$= \arg\max_z \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} -\frac{1}{2\sigma^2} \left( \tilde{\pi}_\theta^{-1}(\pi(\theta)) - z \right)^2 f(s - \theta) ds .$$

Taking the first-order condition with respect to $z$ (which is necessary and sufficient for a maximum as the objective is strictly concave) yields that for any SOE $\tilde{\theta}$ satisfies

$$0 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left( \tilde{\pi}_\theta^{-1}(\pi(\theta)) - \tilde{\theta} \right) f(s - \theta) ds = \tilde{g}(\tilde{\theta}) .$$

Thus, a fundamental is an SOE if and only if it is root of $\tilde{g}$. Since there are only finitely many SOEs, every connected subset where $\tilde{g}$ equals 0 is just a single point and thus beliefs converge to an SOE.

We are left to show that an SOE exists. As we argued above, a state $\tilde{\theta}$ is an SOE if and only if $\tilde{g}(\tilde{\theta}) = 0$. By setting $a = \pi(\theta)$ in Assumption 2, we get that

$$g(\Theta - c) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \tilde{\pi}_\theta^{-1}(\pi(\theta-c)(s_1)) - (\Theta - c) \right] \geq \mathbb{E} [s_1 - c] - (\Theta - c) = 0 .$$

By the same argument $g(\Theta + c) \leq 0$ and hence $g$ must cross zero at least once in the interval $[\Theta - c, \Theta + c]$.

**B.2 Properties of SOE in Equi-directional Problems**

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Since $v$ and $\tilde{v}$ are twice differentiable, the perceived optimal action $\tilde{\pi}_\theta(\cdot)$ and the optimal action $\pi(\cdot)$ are continuous functions. Because they are invertible, they are either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing. We focus on the strictly increasing case; if the functions are strictly decreasing we can re-normalize the signals. Fix a signal $s$. Because $v$ and $\tilde{v}$ do not give rise to the same optimal action and are continuous, either $\pi(\theta) > \tilde{\pi}_\theta(s)$ everywhere or $\pi(\theta) < \tilde{\pi}_\theta(s)$ everywhere. We focus on the former case, the latter is analogous. Hence, for all $s$, the perceived signal $\tilde{\pi}_\theta^{-1}(\pi(\theta)) > s$. 

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We now argue that this implies that \( \tilde{\theta} > \Theta \). The first-order condition corresponding to (1) yields

\[
0 = \frac{\partial}{\partial z} \int \log f \left( \tilde{n}^{-1}_\theta (\pi_\theta (\Theta + \epsilon)) - z \right) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon \bigg|_{z=\tilde{\theta}} = - \int \frac{f' \left( \tilde{n}^{-1}_\theta (\pi_\theta (\Theta + \epsilon)) - z \right)}{f \left( \tilde{n}^{-1}_\theta (\pi_\theta (\Theta + \epsilon)) - z \right)} \bigg|_{z=\tilde{\theta}} f(\epsilon) d\epsilon
\]

\[
= - \int \frac{\left( \tilde{n}^{-1}_\theta (\pi_\theta (\Theta + \epsilon)) - \hat{\theta} \right)}{\sigma^2_\epsilon} f(\epsilon) d\epsilon.
\]

Since an agent who is correctly specified (i.e. for whom \( \tilde{\nu} = \nu \)) perceives the signal correctly (i.e. for such an agent \( (\tilde{n}_\theta)^{-1}(\pi_\theta (\Theta + \epsilon)) = \Theta + \epsilon \) for any \( \tilde{\theta} = \Theta \) solves the analogous first order condition absent misspecification. Since for our misspecified agent \( \tilde{n}_\theta^{-1}(\pi_\theta (\Theta + \epsilon)) > \Theta + \epsilon \), the first order condition can thus only hold when \( \tilde{\theta} > \Theta \).

Because the perceived optimal action is increasing in \( s \) and \( \theta \), and because \( \pi_\theta (s) > \tilde{n}_\theta (s) \geq \tilde{n}_\Theta (s) \). As \( \tilde{n}_\Theta (s) \) maximizes \( \tilde{v}(a, s, \Theta) \) and \( \tilde{v} \) is single-peaked, we thus have

\[
\tilde{v}(\tilde{n}_\Theta (s), s, \Theta) > \tilde{v}(\tilde{n}_\theta (s), s, \Theta) \geq \tilde{v}(\pi_\theta (s), s, \Theta). \]

**B.3 Present-Bias Model with Uncertain Benefits Specified in Section 3.1**

We consider the setting from Section 3.1 in which the agent’s decision utility and perceived decision utility is given by

\[
v(a_t, s_t, \theta) = u(a_t) + \phi_t a_t - \beta \kappa a_t
\]

\[
\tilde{v}(a_t, s_t, \theta) = u(a_t) + \phi_t a_t - \tilde{\beta} \kappa a_t
\]

\[
\phi_t = l\Theta + (1 - l)s_t.
\]

Taking the first-order condition of (20) yields that the objectively and subjectively optimal policies \( \pi_\mu(s), \tilde{n}_\mu(s) \) given a normally distributed belief \( \mu = \mathcal{N}(\mathbb{E}_\mu[\Theta], \sigma^2_\mu) \) and signal \( s \) observed by the agent satisfy

\[
\beta \kappa = u'(\pi_\mu(s)) + \bar{\phi}(s, \mu)
\]

\[
\tilde{\beta} \kappa = u'(\tilde{n}_\mu(s)) + \bar{\phi}(s, \mu). \tag{21}
\]

where

\[
\bar{\phi}(s, \mu) = \left( l\mathbb{E}_\mu[\Theta|s] + (1 - l)s \right) = \frac{l^2 \bar{\sigma}^2_\mu[\Theta] + \sigma^2_\epsilon s}{\frac{\sigma^2_\epsilon}{\sigma^2_\epsilon} + \frac{\sigma^2_\epsilon}{\sigma^2_\epsilon}} + (1 - l)s. \tag{22}
\]
Rearranging yields that
\[
\pi_\mu(s) = (u')^{-1}(\beta \kappa - \bar{\phi}(s, \mu))
\]
\[
\tilde{\pi}_\mu(s) = (u')^{-1}(\tilde{\beta} \kappa - \bar{\phi}(s, \mu)).
\]
(23)

The following lemmas verify the convergence conditions of Proposition 1 for this model.

**Lemma 5.** If the agent’s utility satisfies (20) then Assumption 1 is satisfied.

**Proof.** We first note that \( \bar{\phi}(s, \mu) \) increases in \( s \) for every \( \mu \). As \( u \) is strictly concave, \( u' \) is strictly de- and \( (u')^{-1} \) strictly increasing, and thus \( \pi_\mu, \tilde{\pi}_\mu \) are strictly increasing. \( \square \)

**Lemma 6.** If the agent’s utility satisfies (20) then Assumption 2 is satisfied.

**Proof.** It follows from (23) that \( \pi_\mu(s) \) and \( \tilde{\pi}_\mu(s) \) are continuous, and thus the function \( s \mapsto \tilde{\pi}_{\mu}^{-1}(\pi_{\mu}(s)) \) is also continuous.

Furthermore, by (21), we have that
\[
\beta \kappa = u'(a) + \bar{\phi}(\pi_{\mu}^{-1}(a), \mu)
\]
\[
\tilde{\beta} \kappa = u'(a) + \bar{\phi}(\tilde{\pi}_{\mu}^{-1}(a), \mu).
\]

Subtracting the second from the first equation yields
\[
(\beta - \tilde{\beta}) \kappa = \bar{\phi}(\pi_{\mu}^{-1}(a), \mu) - \bar{\phi}(\tilde{\pi}_{\mu}^{-1}(a), \mu) = (\pi_{\mu}^{-1}(a) - \tilde{\pi}_{\mu}^{-1}(a)) \left[ \frac{l \sigma_{\nu}^{-2}}{\sigma_{\nu}^{-2} + \sigma_{\epsilon}^{-2}} + (1 - l) \right].
\]

Taking absolute values implies that the distance between the true and perceived signal if the action equals \( a \) is bounded
\[
|\pi_{\mu}^{-1}(a) - \tilde{\pi}_{\mu}^{-1}(a)| = \frac{|\beta - \tilde{\beta}| \kappa}{l \sigma_{\nu}^{-2} + (1 - l)} \leq \frac{|\beta - \tilde{\beta}| \kappa}{1 - l}.
\]
(45)

**Lemma 7.** If the agent’s utility satisfies (20) then Assumption 3 is satisfied.

**Proof.** Recall that for every normally distributed belief \( \nu \) with posterior variance \( \sigma^2 \)
\[
\bar{\phi}(s, \nu) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\sigma^2 \nu[\Theta] + \sigma_{\epsilon}^{-2} s}{\sigma^{-2} + \sigma_{\epsilon}^{-2}} + (1 - l)s & \text{if } \sigma^2 > 0 \\
l \nu[\Theta] + (1 - l)s & \text{else}
\end{cases}
\]
As \( l < 1 \), the function \( \tilde{\phi} \) is invertible in its first argument and we denote its inverse by \( \tilde{\phi}^{-1}(\cdot, \nu) \). By (23) we have that for any belief \( \nu \)

\[
\tilde{\pi}_\nu^{-1}(\pi_\nu(s)) = \tilde{\pi}_\nu^{-1}(u'\nu^{-1}(\beta \kappa - \tilde{\phi}(s, \nu))) = \tilde{\phi}^{-1}(\tilde{\beta} \kappa - u'\left([u'\nu^{-1}(\beta \kappa - \tilde{\phi}(s, \nu))]\right), \nu)
\]

\[
= \tilde{\phi}^{-1}(\tilde{\beta} \kappa - \beta \kappa + \tilde{\phi}(s, \nu)) = \frac{\partial \tilde{\phi}^{-1}(\tilde{\phi}(s, \nu))}{\partial \tilde{\phi}}(\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \kappa + \tilde{\phi}^{-1}(\tilde{\phi}(s, \nu), \nu)
\]

\[
= \frac{\sigma^2_\epsilon + \sigma^2}{(1 - l)\sigma^2_\epsilon + \sigma^2}(\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \kappa + s.
\]

Here the second to last equation follows as \( \tilde{\phi} \) and thus also \( \tilde{\phi}^{-1} \) are linear, and the final follows from the fact that \( \frac{\partial \tilde{\phi}^{-1}(\tilde{\phi}(s, \nu))}{\partial \tilde{\phi}} = \frac{\partial \tilde{\phi}(s, \nu)}{\partial s}^{-1} \). As \( \sigma_t \) is the variance of the belief \( \mu_t \), we get that

\[
\tilde{\pi}_\nu^{-1}(\pi_\nu(s)) - \tilde{\pi}_\nu^{-1}(\pi_{\tilde{\theta}_t}(s)) = \frac{l\sigma^2_t}{(1 - l)^2\sigma^2_\epsilon + (1 - l)\sigma^2_t}(\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \kappa \leq \frac{l}{(1 - l)^2\sigma^2_\epsilon}(\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \kappa \sigma^2_t
\]

\[
\leq \frac{l}{(1 - l)^2}\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \kappa (t - 1) \leq \frac{3l(\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \kappa}{(1 - l)^2} t^{-1}.
\]

**Proof of Proposition 3.** It follows from (9) and (10) that

\[
\tilde{\pi}_\nu(s_t) = (u')^{-1}[\beta \kappa - l \tilde{\theta} - (1 - l)s_t]
\]

and

\[
\tilde{\pi}_\theta(s_t) = (u')^{-1}[\tilde{\beta} \kappa - l \tilde{\theta} - (1 - l)s_t].
\]

Thus,

\[
\tilde{\pi}_\nu^{-1}(\tilde{\pi}_\theta(s_t)) = \frac{\tilde{\beta} - \beta}{1 - l} \kappa + s_t.
\]

This implies that

\[
\tilde{\theta} = \Theta + \frac{\tilde{\beta} - \beta}{1 - l} \kappa
\]

is an SOE that satisfies Condition (2) in Observation 1, allowing the agent to perfectly predict his behavior.

We now show that this is the unique SOE. By (1), any SOE needs to solve the following
first-order condition:

\[
0 = \frac{\partial}{\partial z} \int \log f \left( \tilde{\pi}^{-1} \left( \pi_{\epsilon}(\Theta + \epsilon) \right) - z \right) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon \bigg|_{z=\tilde{\theta}} = - \int \frac{f' \left( \tilde{\pi}^{-1} \left( \pi_{\epsilon}(\Theta + \epsilon) \right) - z \right)}{f \left( \tilde{\pi}^{-1} \left( \pi_{\epsilon}(\Theta + \epsilon) \right) - z \right)} f(\epsilon) d\epsilon \\
= - \int \left( \tilde{\pi}^{-1} \left( \pi_{\epsilon}(\Theta + \epsilon) \right) - \tilde{\theta} \right) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon = - \frac{1}{\sigma^2} \left[ \Theta + \frac{\tilde{\beta} - \beta}{1 - l} \kappa - \tilde{\theta} + \int \epsilon f(\epsilon) d\epsilon \right] = 0.
\]

Thus, the SOE is unique.

Substituting into (9) yields the corresponding consumption choice of the agent. Finally — by Lemmas 5, 6, and 7 — we can apply Proposition 1 to conclude that beliefs converge with probability 1 to the unique SOE. \(\square\)

### B.4 Present Bias Model with Uncertain Harm Specified in Section 3.3

We consider the setting from Section 3.3 in which the agent’s objective and subjective utility is given by

\[
v(a_t, s_t, \theta) = u(a_t) - \beta e^{\phi_t} a_t
\]

\[
v(a_t, s_t, \theta) = u(a_t) - \tilde{\beta} e^{\tilde{\phi}_t} a_t
\]

\[
\phi_t = l \Theta + (1 - l) s_t.
\]

Taking the first-order condition of (24) yields that the objectively and subjectively optimal action \(\pi_\mu(s), \tilde{\pi}_\mu(s)\) given a belief \(\mu\) and signal \(s\) taken by the agent satisfy

\[
\beta \mathbb{E}_\mu \left[ e^{\phi(s, \mu)} | s \right] = u'(\pi_\mu(s))
\]

\[
\tilde{\beta} \mathbb{E}_\mu \left[ e^{\tilde{\phi}(s, \mu)} | s \right] = u'(\tilde{\pi}_\mu(s)).
\]

where the posterior given prior \(\mu\) about \(\Theta\) and signal \(s\) is normally distributed and has mean

\[
\bar{\phi}(s, \mu) = (l \mathbb{E}_\mu [\theta] + (1 - l) s) = \frac{l^2 \mathbb{E}_\mu [\theta] + \sigma^2}{\sigma^2} + (1 - l) s
\]

and variance

\[
\text{Var}[\phi(s, \mu)] = l^2 \sigma^2_{t+1}.
\]

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Rearranging (25), using that $\phi(s, \mu)$ is normally distributed to take the expectation, yields that

$$
\pi_{\mu}(s) = (u')^{-1} \left( \beta e^{\bar{\phi}(s, \mu)} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Var} [\phi(s, \mu)] \right)
$$

$$
\tilde{\pi}_{\mu}(s) = (u')^{-1} \left( \tilde{\beta} e^{\bar{\phi}(s, \mu)} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Var} [\phi(s, \mu)] \right).
$$

(26)

Lemma 8. If the agent’s utility satisfies (24) then Assumption 1 is satisfied.

Proof. We first note that $\bar{\phi}(s, \mu)$ increases in $s$ for every $\mu$ and that $\text{Var}[\phi(s, \mu)]$ is independent of $s$. Thus $e^{\bar{\phi}(s, \mu)} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}[\phi(s, \mu)]$ is increasing in $s$. As $u$ is strictly concave, $u'$ is strictly de- and $(u')^{-1}$ strictly increasing, and thus $\pi_{\mu}, \tilde{\pi}_{\mu}$ are strictly increasing.

Lemma 9. If the agent’s utility satisfies (24) then Assumption 2 is satisfied.

Proof. It follows from (26) that $\pi_{\mu}(s)$ and $\tilde{\pi}_{\mu}(s)$ are continuous, and thus the function $s \mapsto \tilde{\pi}_{\mu}^{-1}(\pi_{\mu}(s))$ is also continuous. Furthermore, by (26) and the fact that $\text{Var}[\phi(s, \mu)]$ is independent of $s$, we have that $\beta e^{\bar{\phi}(\pi_{\mu}^{-1}(a), \mu)} = \tilde{\beta} e^{\bar{\phi}(\tilde{\pi}_{\mu}^{-1}(a), \mu)}$. Taking logarithm and rewriting yields

$$(\ln \tilde{\beta} - \ln \beta) = \bar{\phi}(\pi_{\mu}^{-1}(a), \mu) - \bar{\phi}(\tilde{\pi}_{\mu}^{-1}(a), \mu) = (\pi_{\mu}^{-1}(a) - \tilde{\pi}_{\mu}^{-1}(a)) \left[ \frac{l \sigma_c^2}{\sigma_t^2 + \sigma_c^2} + (1 - l) \right].$$

Taking absolute values implies that

$$
|\pi_{\mu}^{-1}(a) - \tilde{\pi}_{\mu}^{-1}(a)| = \frac{|\ln \tilde{\beta} - \ln \beta|}{l \sigma_c^2/(\sigma_t^2 + \sigma_c^2) + (1 - l)} \leq \frac{|\ln \tilde{\beta} - \ln \beta|}{1 - l}.
$$

Lemma 10. If the agent’s utility satisfies (24) then Assumption 3 is satisfied.

Proof. Recall that for every normally distributed belief $\nu$ with variance $\sigma^2$

$$
\bar{\phi}(s, \nu) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{l \sigma_c^2 E_{\nu}[\Theta] + \sigma_c^2 s}{\sigma_t^2 + \sigma_c^2} + (1 - l)s & \text{if } \sigma^2 > 0 \\
\l E_{\nu}[\Theta] + (1 - l)s & \text{else}
\end{cases}.
$$

As $l < 1$, the function $\bar{\phi}$ is invertible in its first argument and we denote its inverse by $\bar{\phi}^{-1}(\cdot, \nu)$. 

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By (26) we have that for any belief ν
\[
\pi^{-1}_\nu(\pi_\nu(s)) = \pi^{-1}_\nu\left((u')^{-1}\left(\beta e^{\phi(s,\nu)} + \frac{1}{2}\text{Var}[\phi(s,\mu)]\right)\right)
\]
\[
= \phi^{-1} \left(\ln \left[\beta e^{\phi(s,\nu)}\right] - \ln \beta, \nu\right)
\]
\[
= \phi^{-1}(\ln \beta - \ln \beta + \phi(s,\nu), \nu)
\]
\[
= \frac{\partial \phi^{-1}(\phi, \nu)}{\partial \phi} (\ln \beta - \ln \beta) + \phi^{-1}(\phi(s,\nu), \nu)
\]
\[
= \frac{\sigma^2_\epsilon + \sigma^2_\ell}{(1 - l)\sigma^2_\epsilon + \sigma^2_\ell} (\ln \beta - \ln \beta) + s. \tag{27}
\]
Here the second line exploits that (26) implies that
\[
\bar{\phi}(\pi^{-1}_\nu(a), \nu) = \ln[u'(a)] - \ln \beta - \frac{1}{2}\text{Var}[\phi(\pi^{-1}_\nu(a), \mu)];
\]
the second to last equation follows as \(\bar{\phi}\) and thus also \(\bar{\phi}^{-1}\) are linear; and the final follows from the fact that \(\partial \frac{\phi^{-1}(\phi, \nu)}{\partial \phi} = (\partial \phi(s,\nu)/\partial s)\)^{-1}. As \(\sigma_\ell\) is the variance of the belief \(\mu_\ell\), we get that
\[
\left|\tilde{\pi}^{-1}_\mu(\pi_\mu(s)) - \tilde{\pi}^{-1}_\theta(\pi_\theta(s))\right| = \left|\frac{\sigma^2_\epsilon + \sigma^2_\ell}{(1 - l)\sigma^2_\epsilon + \sigma^2_\ell} - \frac{\sigma^2_\epsilon}{(1 - l)\sigma^2_\ell}\right| (\ln \beta - \ln \beta)
\]
\[
\leq \frac{l\sigma^2_\ell}{(1 - l)^2\sigma^2_\epsilon + (1 - l)\sigma^2_\ell} (\ln \beta - \ln \beta)
\]
\[
\leq \frac{l}{(1 - l)^2\sigma^2_\epsilon} (\ln \beta - \ln \beta)\sigma^2_\ell
\]
\[
= \frac{l}{(1 - l)^2\sigma^2_\epsilon} (\ln \beta - \ln \beta) \frac{1}{\sigma^{-2}_\ell + \sigma^{-2}_\epsilon(t - 1)}
\]
\[
\leq \frac{l}{(1 - l)^2} (\ln \beta - \ln \beta)(t - 1)^{-1}
\]
\[
\leq \frac{3l(l\ln \beta - \ln \beta)}{(1 - l)^2} t^{-1}. \tag{27}
\]

Proof of Proposition 4. By Equation 27,
\[
\tilde{\pi}^{-1}_\theta(\pi_\theta(\Theta + \epsilon)) = \Theta - \frac{\ln \beta - \ln \beta}{1 - l} + \epsilon.
\]
Since by (1), any SOE needs to solve the following first-order condition, the above fact yields

\[ 0 = \frac{\partial}{\partial z} \int \log \left( \frac{\tilde{\pi}(\Theta + \epsilon)}{\tilde{\pi}^{-1}(\pi(\Theta + \epsilon))} \right) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon \bigg|_{z=\tilde{\theta}} = -\int \frac{f' \left( \frac{\tilde{\pi}^{-1}(\pi(\Theta + \epsilon)) - z}{\tilde{\pi}^{-1}(\pi(\Theta + \epsilon)) - \tilde{\theta}} \right)}{f(\epsilon)} f(\epsilon) d\epsilon \]

Thus there is a unique SOE \( \tilde{\theta} \) given by

\[ \tilde{\theta} = \Theta - \ln \beta - \ln \tilde{\beta} \frac{1 - l}{1 - l} - \tilde{\theta} + \int \epsilon f(\epsilon) d\epsilon = 0 \]

which satisfies Condition (2). Furthermore, Lemmas 8, 9, and 10 verify that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Thus, Proposition 1 implies that beliefs converge with probability one to the unique SOE above.

**B.5 Proofs for Subsections 3.5 and 3.6**

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Recall that we denote by \( E_{\mu_t}[|s_t] \) the expectation of the agent in period \( t \) before taking an action. Given belief \( \mu_t \) and signal \( s_t \), an agent’s action at time \( t \) maximizes

\[ \max_{a_t} E_{\mu_t} \left[ u(a_t) + (l\theta_t + (1 - l)s_t) - \beta\kappa a_t | s_t \right]. \]  

(28)

(i) Consider an inexperienced agent, i.e. an agent at time \( t = 1 \), whose prior mean equals the state (i.e., \( \theta_1 = \Theta \)). We prove that the outside observer correctly infers the agent’s time-inconsistency and sophistication, i.e. estimates the pair \( \beta, \tilde{\beta} \) correctly from observing the distribution of actions. Throughout, we denote by \( \hat{\beta}, \hat{\tilde{\beta}}, \hat{\Theta}, \) etc the estimates formed by the outside observer of the respective quantities.

We first establish that an outsider will infer \( \hat{\beta} - \hat{\Theta} = \beta - \Theta \) from the distribution of the agent’s action at time \( t = 1 \). Using (15), the fact that \( \theta_1 = \Theta \), and that the agent choose the action

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after having observed $s_1$, the agent’s policy function hence is

$$\pi_{\mu_1}(s_1) = (u')^{-1} \left[ \beta \kappa - l \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2 t} \Theta - \left( 1 - l \frac{\sigma_1^2}{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2 t} \right) \epsilon_1 \right].$$

For brevity, define

$$l_1 \equiv l \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2 t}.$$

An inexperienced agent’s action as a function of the signal $s_1 = \Theta + \epsilon_1$ equals

$$\pi_{\mu_1}(s_1) = (u')^{-1} \left[ \beta \kappa - \Theta - (1 - l_1) \epsilon_1 \right].$$

Since the observer knows the functional form of $u$ and supposes that the inexperienced agents also knows $\Theta$, she incorrectly believes the inexperienced agent uses the policy function

$$\pi_{\hat{\Theta}}(s_1) = (u')^{-1} \left[ \hat{\beta} \kappa - \hat{\Theta} - (1 - l_1) \epsilon_1 \right].$$

As a result, she infers

$$\hat{\beta} \kappa - \hat{\Theta} - (1 - l_1) \epsilon_1 = \beta \kappa - \Theta - (1 - l_1) \epsilon_1$$

from the observed actions. Note that the right and left-hand side above are normally distributed. Using that the noise on average is zero, the observer can perfectly explain the inexperienced agent’s action with the correct $\beta \kappa - \Theta$ and an estimated variance of the signal of $\hat{\sigma}_\epsilon^2 = \sigma_\epsilon^2 (1 - l_1)^2 / (1 - l)^2$.

Denote by $\hat{f}(\epsilon)$ the density of the normal distribution with mean zero and variance $\hat{\sigma}_\epsilon^2$.

We next show that the observer infers $\hat{\beta} - \hat{\beta} = \hat{\beta} - \beta$ from the agents’ expectation of their own consumption (which by assumption of the proposition is known). The inexperienced agents expect a mean consumption of

$$\int (u')^{-1} [\hat{\beta} \kappa - \hat{\Theta} - (1 - l_1) \epsilon] f(\epsilon) d\epsilon,$$

which, as $(1 - l_1) \epsilon$ has the same distribution under $f$ as $(1 - l) \epsilon$ has under $\hat{f}$, is the same as

$$\int (u')^{-1} [\hat{\beta} \kappa - \hat{\Theta} - (1 - l) \epsilon] \hat{f}(\epsilon) d\epsilon.$$
Hence, knowing the functional form of $u$ and believing that the density of $\epsilon$ is $\hat{f}(\epsilon)$, the observer correctly infers $\kappa\beta - \Theta$ from the inexperienced agents’ observed predicted mean consumption. Subtracting his previously obtained estimate of $\beta\kappa - \Theta$, the observer learns $(\beta - \beta)\kappa$ and since she knows $\kappa$, she correctly infers $\hat{\beta} - \hat{\beta} = \beta - \beta$.

Finally, we show that the observer infers $\hat{\beta} = \beta$ from the agents’ marginal value of decreasing consumption without discounting (which is observable by the assumptions of the proposition). Intuitively, the agent’s perceived benefit of marginally decreasing self 1’s action only depends on the perceived conflict of interest between agent’s selves, which is captured by $(1 - \beta)\kappa$. Thus, knowing $\kappa$, the observer correctly infers $\beta$ from the agent’s stated benefit of a marginal reduction of the action. Formally, the marginal value of decreasing the subjective choice of $a_1 \equiv \bar{\pi}_{\mu_1}(\Theta + \epsilon)$ to the long-run self is

$$-\int \left( u'(\bar{\pi}_{\mu_1}(\Theta + \epsilon)) + \Theta + (1 - l_1)\epsilon - \beta\kappa - (1 - \beta)\kappa \right) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon = (1 - \beta)\kappa,$$

while the observer believes that agent’s belief about his action is given by $a_1 \equiv \bar{\pi}_\Theta(\Theta + \epsilon)$ and the subjective marginal value of decreasing the action is

$$-\int \left( u'(\bar{\pi}_\Theta(\hat{\Theta} + \epsilon)) + \hat{\Theta} + (1 - l_2)\epsilon - \hat{\beta}\kappa - (1 - \hat{\beta})\kappa \right) \hat{f}(\epsilon) d\epsilon = (1 - \hat{\beta})\kappa.$$

Given the observer’s inference of $\hat{\beta} - \beta$ above, she thus also correctly infers $\beta$. Furthermore, with these parameters and the estimated density $\hat{f}(\epsilon)$ of the error distribution, the observer can perfectly explain all observed choices of inexperienced agents.

(ii) We next consider the experienced agent, i.e. the limit of the observer’s inferences when $t \to \infty$ and behavior converged to an SOE.

We first show that from observing the agent’s actions the observer comes to believe that $\hat{\beta}\kappa - \hat{\Theta} = \tilde{\beta}\kappa - \tilde{\theta}$. By Observation 1, for the realized fundamental $\Theta$, an experienced agent’s long-run SOE belief $\bar{\theta}$ for every $\epsilon$ solves

$$\pi_{\bar{\theta}}(\Theta + \epsilon) = \bar{\pi}_{\bar{\theta}}(\Theta + \epsilon).$$
Given the above SOE, the experienced agent’s policy function is $\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(\Theta + \epsilon)$, so that

$$\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}(\Theta + \epsilon) = \tilde{\pi}_{\tilde{\theta}}(\tilde{\theta} + \epsilon) = (u')^{-1}[\tilde{\beta}\kappa - \tilde{\theta} - (1 - l)\epsilon]. \quad (29)$$

Under the incorrect assumption that the agent knows the true fundamental (but allowing it to differ from the actually true realization), the observer believes the agent uses a policy function $\pi_{\hat{\Theta}}(\hat{\Theta} + \epsilon)$ for some to her unknown fundamental $\hat{\Theta}$, that is she thinks the agent’s policy function satisfies

$$\pi_{\hat{\theta}}(\hat{\Theta} + \epsilon) = (u')^{-1}[\hat{\beta}\kappa - \hat{\theta} - (1 - l)\epsilon]. \quad (30)$$

Comparing the right-hand sides of (29) and (30) yields that to explain the average action, the observer must conclude that $\hat{\beta}\kappa - \hat{\Theta} = \tilde{\beta}\kappa - \tilde{\theta}$. Furthermore, to explain the variance of actions, she concludes that $\epsilon$ is distributed according to the true distribution $f(\epsilon)$. Given this, she can perfectly explain the distribution of the experienced agent’s observed actions.

We next establish that the outside observer infers from the agent’s reported expected subjective mean consumption that $\hat{\beta} - \tilde{\beta} = 0$. The experienced agent expects a mean consumption of

$$\int (u')^{-1}[\hat{\beta}\kappa - \hat{\theta} - (1 - l)\epsilon]f(\epsilon)\,d\epsilon,$$

while the observer incorrectly thinks the agent expects a mean consumption of

$$\int (u')^{-1}[\tilde{\beta}\kappa - \tilde{\theta} - (1 - l)\epsilon]f(\epsilon)\,d\epsilon.$$

Thus the observer, supposing that the experienced agent knows the true fundamental, misinfers that $\hat{\beta}\kappa - \hat{\Theta} = \tilde{\beta}\kappa - \tilde{\theta}$. Combining this with her conclusion from above that $\hat{\beta}\kappa - \hat{\Theta} = \tilde{\beta}\kappa - \tilde{\theta}$, yields $\hat{\beta} = \tilde{\beta}$.

Finally, we establish that the outside observer learns $\hat{\beta} = \tilde{\beta}$. The experienced long-run self’s perceived marginal value of decreasing the perceived choice of $a_t \equiv \tilde{\pi}_{\tilde{\theta}}(\tilde{\theta} + \epsilon)$ is

$$- \int \left\{ u'(\tilde{\pi}_{\tilde{\theta}}(\tilde{\theta} + \epsilon)) + (l\hat{\beta} + (1 - l)(\hat{\theta} + \epsilon) - \hat{\beta}\kappa - (1 - \hat{\beta})\kappa \right\} f(\epsilon)\,d\epsilon = (1 - \hat{\beta})\kappa,$$
while the observer thinks $a_t \equiv \tilde{\pi}_t(\hat{\Theta} + \epsilon)$ and thus the perceived marginal value of decreasing it is

$$- \int \left\{ u'(a_t) + (l\hat{\Theta} + (1-l)(\hat{\Theta} + \epsilon)) - \hat{\beta} \kappa - (1 - \hat{\beta})\kappa \right\} f(\epsilon) d\epsilon = (1 - \hat{\beta})\kappa. $$

Hence, the observer correctly learns $\hat{\beta} = \tilde{\beta}$ from the experienced agent’s expected marginal value of decreasing consumption. Note that the correct inference of $\tilde{\beta}$ together with the misinference that $\hat{\beta} = \tilde{\beta}$ allows the observer to perfectly explain all observed choices of the experienced agent. □

**Proof of Proposition 6.** Recall that $\tilde{\theta}_t = \mathbb{E}_{\mu_t}[\theta]$ denotes the posterior mean (or log-likelihood maximizing) belief regarding the fundamental, and $\sigma_t^2$ the corresponding variance, prior to observing the signal $s_t$. Given our normal-normal structure, $\mu_t$ has precision $\sigma_t^{-2} = \sigma_1^{-2} + \sigma_\epsilon^{-2}(t-1)$, where $\sigma_\epsilon^{-2}$ is the precision of $\epsilon_t$.

Part (i): For $t \geq 2$, define

$$\omega_t \equiv \frac{\sigma_t^2}{1 - l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_t^2}{\sigma_\epsilon^2} \right)},$$

and for future reference note that $\omega_t \in (0, 1)$ since $\sigma_t^2 < \sigma_\epsilon^2$. We next argue that $\omega_t > (1 - \omega_t)\omega_{t-1}$. This is equivalent to

$$\sigma_t^2 \sigma_\epsilon^2 (1 - l) + \sigma_{t-1}^2 \sigma_\epsilon^2 > \sigma_{t-1}^2 \sigma_t^2 (1 - l).$$

This inequality is linear in $l$ and holds for $l = 1$. Furthermore, because $\sigma_\epsilon^2 + \sigma_{t-1}^2 = \sigma_t^2 \sigma_{t-1}^2 \sigma_t^{-2}$ the left-hand side above equals the right-hand side when $l = 0$. Thus, the inequality holds for all $l \in (0, 1)$.

Upon observing the signal $s_t$, normal updating implies that the agent’s posterior mean belief becomes

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mu_t}[\Theta|s_t] = \tilde{\theta}_t + \frac{\sigma_t^2 + 1}{\sigma_\epsilon^2} (s_t - \tilde{\theta}_t).$$

Denote the chosen action as a function of $s_t$ and $\tilde{\theta}_t$ by $a_t(s_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)$. Rewriting the first-order-condition for the maximization of $v$ using that the expectation of $\phi_t$ given $s_t$ and $\tilde{\theta}_t$ equals $\mathbb{E}_{\mu_t}[\Theta|s_t] + (1 - l)s_t$ yields

$$a_t(s_t, \tilde{\theta}_t) = l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_t^2}{\sigma_\epsilon^2} + 1 \right) \tilde{\theta}_t + \left[ 1 - l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_t^2}{\sigma_\epsilon^2} + 1 \right) \right] s_t - \beta \kappa. \quad (31)$$

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Hence, the true signal $s_t$ as a function of the agent’s chosen action $a_t$ can be inferred using

$$s_t = \frac{a_t + \beta \kappa - l \left(1 - \frac{\sigma_{t+1}^2}{\sigma_e^2}\right) \tilde{\theta}_t}{1 - l \left(1 - \frac{\sigma_{t+1}^2}{\sigma_e^2}\right)}.$$

But because the agent when looking back thinks she used $\tilde{\beta}$, she infers from $a_t$ that she observed the signal

$$\tilde{s}_t = \frac{a_t + \tilde{\beta} \kappa - l \left(1 - \frac{\sigma_{t+1}^2}{\sigma_e^2}\right) \tilde{\theta}_t}{1 - l \left(1 - \frac{\sigma_{t+1}^2}{\sigma_e^2}\right)}.$$  (32)

Since when looking back at his action the agent updates his beliefs based on the perceived signal $\tilde{s}_t$, normal-normal updating implies that

$$\tilde{\theta}_t = \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_e^2}{\sigma_e^2} (\tilde{s}_{t-1} - \tilde{\theta}_{t-1}) = \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_e^2}{\sigma_e^2} \left(1 - l \left(1 - \frac{\sigma_{t+1}^2}{\sigma_e^2}\right)\right) (a_{t-1} + \beta \kappa - \tilde{\theta}_{t-1})$$

$$= (1 - \omega_t) \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} + \omega_t (a_{t-1} + \beta \kappa).$$  (33)

Now using (33) to express $\tilde{\theta}_t$ as a function of past actions yields

$$\tilde{\theta}_t = \sum_{j=1}^{t-1} a_{t-j} \left(\omega_{t-j+1} \prod_{k=t-j+2}^{t} (1 - \omega_k)\right) + \beta \kappa \left(\sum_{j=1}^{t-1} \omega_{t-j+1} \prod_{k=t-j+2}^{t} (1 - \omega_k)\right) + \tilde{\theta}_1 \prod_{j=2}^{t} (1 - \omega_j).$$

Using this and (31), one has for $\tau < t$ that

$$\frac{\partial a_t(s_t, a_{t-1})}{\partial a_{\tau}} = \frac{\partial a_t(s_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)}{\partial \tilde{\theta}_t} \frac{\partial \tilde{\theta}_t}{\partial a_{\tau}} = l \left(1 - \frac{\sigma_{t+1}^2}{\sigma_e^2}\right) \omega_{\tau+1} \left(\prod_{k=\tau+2}^{t} (1 - \omega_k)\right) > 0.$$

Furthermore because $\omega_{\tau+2} > \omega_{\tau+1}(1 - \omega_{\tau+2})$, it follows that

$$\frac{\partial a_t(s_t, a_{t-1})}{\partial a_{\tau+1}} > \frac{\partial a_t(s_t, a_{t-1})}{\partial a_{\tau}}.$$

Part II. Since the difference between the perceived and objective signal

$$\tilde{s}_t - s_t = \frac{(\beta - \beta) \kappa}{1 - l \left(1 - \frac{\sigma_{t+1}^2}{\sigma_e^2}\right)} > 0,$$  (34)
one has $\tilde{\theta}_t = E_{\mu_t}[\Theta] > E[\Theta|s_t^t]$. Furthermore, since the difference $\bar{s}_t - s_t$ is increasing in $\kappa$ so does the agent’s overestimation of the fundamental. Since $a_t(s_t, \tilde{\theta}_t)$ is increasing in $\tilde{\theta}_t$, it follows that $a_t - a_t^* > 0$ and strictly increasing in $\kappa$.

Part III. Since from an ex ante perspective $E_{\mu_1}[s_t] = E_{\mu_1}[\Theta]$, (31) implies that

$$E_{\mu_1}[a_t] = l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma^2_{t+1}}{\sigma^2_{t}} \right) E_{\mu_1}[\tilde{\theta}_t] + \left[ 1 - l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma^2_{t+1}}{\sigma^2_{t}} \right) \right] E_{\mu_1}[\Theta] - \beta \kappa. \quad (35)$$

Using (33) and (34) to express the mean posterior belief as function of the prior mean and the objective signals yields

$$\tilde{\theta}_t = \sum_{k=2}^t \prod_{\tau=k+1}^t \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma^2_{\tau}}{\sigma^2_{t}} \right) \frac{\sigma^2_{\tau}}{\sigma^2_{t}} s_k + \prod_{k=2}^t \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma^2_{k}}{\sigma^2_{t}} \right) \tilde{\theta}_1 + \left[ \sum_{k=2}^t \prod_{\tau=k+1}^t \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma^2_{\tau}}{\sigma^2_{t}} \right) \omega_k \right] (\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \kappa.$$

Taking the ex ante expectation using that $E_{\mu_1}[s_k] = E_{\mu_1}[\Theta]$ and $\tilde{\theta}_1 = E_{\mu_1}[\Theta]$ gives

$$E_{\mu_1}[\tilde{\theta}_t] = E_{\mu_1}[\Theta] + \left[ \sum_{k=2}^t \prod_{\tau=k+1}^t \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma^2_{\tau}}{\sigma^2_{t}} \right) \omega_k \right] (\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \kappa.$$
We now argue that the term in square brackets, and hence $E_{\mu_1}[\tilde{\theta}_t]$, is increasing in $t$. One has

$$
\left[ \sum_{k=2}^{t-1} \prod_{\tau=k+1}^{t-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_\tau^2}{\sigma_\tau^2} \right) \omega_k \right] - \left[ \sum_{k=2}^{t} \prod_{\tau=k+1}^{t} \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_\tau^2}{\sigma_\tau^2} \right) \omega_k \right] \geq \omega_t - \frac{\sigma_t^2}{\sigma_{t-1}^2} \omega_2 \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_{t-1}^2}{\sigma_t^2} \right) \frac{1 - \left( \frac{\sigma_{t-1}^2}{\sigma_t^2} \right)^4}{1 - \left( \frac{\sigma_{t-1}^2}{\sigma_t^2} \right)}
$$

where the first inequality uses the facts that $\sigma_t$ and $\omega_t$ are decreasing in $t$, the second follows from replacing the numerator of the final ratio by 1, the third from the fact that $\sigma_{t-1} < \sigma_t$, and the last equality uses that $\sigma_t^2 + \sigma_{t-1}^2 = \sigma_t^2 \sigma_{t-1}^2 \sigma_t^{-2}$. We conclude that $E_{\mu_1}[\tilde{\theta}_t]$ is increasing in $t$, and also that $E_{\mu_1}[\tilde{\theta}_t] > E_{\mu_1}[\theta]$ for all $t > 1$. Since also $\sigma_{t+1}^2 < \sigma_t^2$, (35) implies that $E_{\mu_1}[a_t]$ is strictly increasing in $t$. Furthermore, since $E_{\mu_1}[\tilde{\theta}_t] - E_{\mu_1}[\tilde{\theta}_{t-1}]$ is strictly increasing in $\kappa$, (35) implies that so is $E_{\mu_1}[a_t] - E_{\mu_1}[a_{t-1}]$.

Finally, by the law of iterated expectations (which applies to the subjective beliefs of the agent as he believes to be correctly specified), we get that the agent’s ex ante belief $\tilde{E}_{\mu_1}[a_t] = E_{\mu_1}[\Theta] - \tilde{\beta}k$, which is constant. □

Proof of Corollary 1. By Equation (31), the agent reacts to the new information according to $\partial a_t/\partial \kappa = -\beta$. But plugging the SOE belief in Equation (12) into the formula for consumption $a_t$ in Equation (9), the agent’s long-response is $\partial a_t/\partial \kappa = -\beta + l(\tilde{\beta} - \beta)/(1 - l)$. □
C Appendix: Two Dimensions of Uncertainty

Consider a variant of our main model in which the agent is uncertain about the benefit $\Theta^b$ and the harm $\Theta^\kappa$ of consuming. The prior regarding each fundamental is normal, and the agent believes these fundamentals to be independently drawn. In every period, nature chooses signals $s^b_t = \Theta^b + e^b_t$ and $s^\kappa_t = \Theta^\kappa + e^\kappa_t$, where the error terms are drawn normally and independently. In odd periods the agent observes $s^b_t$, and in even periods he observes $s^\kappa_t$ before choosing his consumption level $a_t$. He maximizes the expectation of $v(a_t, s^b_t, s^\kappa_t, \theta^b, \theta^\kappa) = u(a_t) + \phi^b_t a_t - \beta e^\kappa_t a_t$, where $\phi^b_t = l\Theta^b + (1 - l)s^b_t$ and $\phi^\kappa_t = l\Theta^\kappa + (1 - l)s^\kappa_t$. He believes that all other selves maximize the utility function in which $\tilde{\beta}$ replaces $\beta$ above.

Because the agent only observes $s^\kappa_t$ in even periods, he changes his beliefs regarding $\tilde{\Theta}^\kappa$ only in even periods. We first focus on updating in these periods. Let $\tilde{\theta}^b_t$ denote the mean benefit of consumption as perceived by the agent in period $t$. And analogously to our basic model, denote by $\mu^\kappa_t$ the agent’s belief about $\Theta^\kappa$ at the beginning of period $t$. The agent chooses $a_t$ to satisfy

$$u'(a_t) + \tilde{\theta}^b_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_{\mu^\kappa_t}[e^{\phi^\kappa_t}|s^\kappa_t]$$

Since in an even period the agent does not observe $s^b_t$, he later has correct beliefs regarding $\tilde{\theta}^b_t$. Furthermore, since $\mu^\kappa_t$ only depends on previous actions, he has the correct belief about $\mu^\kappa_t$ as well. Hence, he believes that in period $t$ he chooses $a_t$ according to

$$u'(a_t) + \tilde{\theta}^\kappa_t = \tilde{\beta} \mathbb{E}_{\mu^\kappa_t}[e^{\phi^\kappa_t}|s^\kappa_t].$$

These observations imply that the signal $\tilde{s}^\kappa_t$ the agent believes he has observed solves $\tilde{\beta} \mathbb{E}_{\mu^\kappa_t}[e^{\phi^\kappa_t}|\tilde{s}^\kappa_t] = \beta \mathbb{E}_{\mu^\kappa_t}[e^{\phi^\kappa_t}|s^\kappa_t]$. Notice that this is independent of $\tilde{\theta}^b_t$. Consequently, for any $t$, $\mu^\kappa_t$, and $s^\kappa_t$ the agent extracts the same $\tilde{s}^\kappa_t$ as when $\tilde{\theta}^b_t = 0$, i.e., as in the model of Section 3.3. By Proposition 4, therefore, his beliefs regarding future harm converge with probability one to

$$\tilde{\theta}^\kappa = \Theta^\kappa - \frac{\ln \tilde{\beta} - \ln \beta}{1 - l}.$$

Now note that the agent changes his beliefs about the benefit only in odd periods. With abuse of notation, we restrict attention to the agent’s behavior in odd periods, with $\tau = t + 1/2$ denoting the
position of the period in the sequence of odd numbers. Let $\tilde{\kappa}_t = \tilde{\kappa}_{2\tau - 1} = E_{\mu^b_t} [e^{\tilde{\theta}^b_t}]$ be the expected marginal harm as perceived by the agent when choosing $a_{2\tau - 1}$. Crucially, the agent has the correct belief about this the harm perceived in previous (odd) periods. This allows us to follow the first steps of Proposition 6 with minor modifications. In particular, Equation (31) becomes

$$u'(a_{2\tau - 1}) = l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_{\tau + 1}^2}{\sigma_\tau^2} \right) \hat{\theta}^b_{2\tau - 1} + \left[ 1 - l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_{\tau + 1}^2}{\sigma_\tau^2} \right) \right] s^b_{2\tau - 1} - \beta \tilde{\kappa}_{2\tau - 1}.$$ 

Hence,

$$s^b_{2\tau - 1} = \frac{u'(a_{2\tau - 1}) + \beta \tilde{\kappa}_{2\tau - 1} - l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_{\tau + 1}^2}{\sigma_\tau^2} \right) \hat{\theta}^b_{2\tau - 1}}{1 - l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_{\tau + 1}^2}{\sigma_\tau^2} \right)},$$

and

$$\tilde{s}^b_t = \frac{u'(a_{2\tau - 1}) + \tilde{\beta} \tilde{\kappa}_{2\tau - 1} - l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_{\tau + 1}^2}{\sigma_\tau^2} \right) \hat{\theta}^b_{2\tau - 1}}{1 - l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_{\tau + 1}^2}{\sigma_\tau^2} \right)},$$

and therefore

$$\tilde{s}^b_{2\tau - 1} - s^b_{2\tau - 1} = \frac{(\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \tilde{\kappa}_{2\tau - 1}}{1 - l \left( 1 - \frac{\sigma_{\tau + 1}^2}{\sigma_\tau^2} \right)}. \quad (36)$$

Since $\tilde{\kappa}_t$ converges with probability one to a constant $\tilde{\kappa}$ and the denominator on the right-hand side converges to $1 - l > 0$, the right-hand side converges with probability one to $(\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \tilde{\kappa}/(1 - l)$.

The law of large numbers implies that $(\sum_{t=1}^{T} s^b_t)/T$ converges with probability one to $\Theta^b$. Hence, $(\sum_{t=1}^{T} \tilde{s}^b_t)/T$ converges with probability one to

$$\Theta^b + \frac{(\tilde{\beta} - \beta) \tilde{\kappa}}{1 - l}.$$ 

This is therefore the agent’s limiting belief $\tilde{\theta}^b$ about the benefit of consumption.